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CHILD SUPPORT HARMING CHILDREN:
SUBORDINATING THE BEST INTERESTS
OF CHILDREN TO THE FISCAL
INTERESTS OF THE STATE

Daniel L. Hatcher*

This Article examines the government policy of seeking
reimbursement of welfare costs through child support
enforcement. Under our welfare program, Temporary Aid to
Needy Families, custodial parents applying for benefits are
required to establish child support obligations against the
absent parents and to assign the resulting child support
payments to the government. As a result, half of the $105
billion in national child support debt is owed to the government
rather than to children. The government's fiscal interests are
in direct conflict with the best interests of the children-the
controlling legal standard in child support matters. The
conflict results in legal confusion, and the welfare cost recovery
Children in
efforts harm children, families, and society.
welfare families struggling to become self-sufficient lose out as
their support payments are redirected to the government.
Fragile relationships between mothers, fathers, and children
are often broken. The fiscal benefit to the government is
minimal at best. And the social fabric is torn as significant
numbers of welfare fathers retreat from the workforce and their
families. This Article thoroughly examines the conflict and
resulting legal and policy questions. The Article explores the
history of the competing interests and purposes of child support
in America, describes the framework and impact of the current
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earlier drafts of this Article at the 2006 Southeastern Association of Law
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International Society of Family Law North America Regional Conference, and
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government welfare cost recovery system, addresses the long
ignored and unresolved legal questions that result from the
conflicting missions, and concludes with suggestions for
reform, including the Article's primary conclusion that welfare
cost recovery is a failed effort-and should therefore end.

INTRODUCTION

Welfare is not free. Out ofthe $105 billion in child support debt
nationwide, the government claims half so it can seek to recoup the
costs of welfare benefits provided to low-income families. l Our
current welfare program, called Temporary Aid to Needy Families
("TANF"), requires custodial parents applying for benefits to
cooperate in establishing child support obligations against the
absent parents and to simultaneously assign the resulting child
support payments to the governmene Mothers, fathers, and
children all become government debtors-the mothers and children
owe their child support rights and the fathers owe the paymentsuntil the welfare benefits are repaid in full. a
This system of welfare cost recovery is a side of child support
that is largely unknown to the public. 4 Rather, child support is
1. Total child support arrearages due as of 2006 was $105,416,002,292.
OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, FY 2006 PRELIMINARY REPORT tb1.5
(2007),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programslcse/pubsl2007/preliminaryJeportl
index.html [hereinafter 2006 REPORT]. The Federal Office of Child Support
Enforcement has previously estimated that half of all child support arrearages
are owed to the government rather than to families. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT (CSE) FY 2002 PRELIMINARY DATA REPORT (2003),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubsl2003/reports/prelim_datareportl
[hereinafter 2002 REPORT].
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 608(a)(2)-(3), 654(29) (2000). Child support cooperation
and assignment requirements are also present in other public benefit programs,
such as foster care assistance, Medicaid and the Food Stamp Program. See
PAULA ROBERTS, CTR. FOR LAw & SOC. POLICY, CHILD SUPPORT COOPERATION
REQUIREMENTS AND PuBLIC BENEFIT PROGRAMS: AN OVERVIEW OF ISSUES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (2005), available at http://clasp.org/
publicationslcs_cooperation_requirements.pdf.
For example, when a child
enters foster care, the child's rights to child support are assigned to reimburse
the government's costs of providing foster care services. § 671(a)(17).
3. For simplicity, this Article refers to custodial parents as mothers and
noncustodial parents as fathers, although certainly recognizing that the
situation is often reversed. See Liliana Sousa & Elaine Sorensen, The Economic
Reality of Nonresident Mothers and Their Children, NEW FEDERALISM: NAT'L
SURV. AM.'s FAMILIES (The Urban lnst.), May 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.urban.org/publicationsl311342.html.
4. Welfare cost recovery through the child support program is one of
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generally perceived as a pure good: a benefit to children, families,
and society, as well as a moral and legal obligation of absent
parents. But for the millions of children whose child support has
been assigned to the government,5 the reality of child support is
anything but pure or good. Poor mothers are forced to name absent
fathers, and then sue them-and sue them again and again.
Because the fathers are often also poor, the vast amount of assigned
child support goes unpaid and insurmountable arrearages quickly
result. 6 The fathers who try almost always fail as the automated
enforcement mechanisms throttle endlessly: a trucker's license is
suspended, so he cannot work; a laborer's wages are garnished at
sixty-five percent, so he cannot afford to pay his own rent; a father
obtains a new job and then loses it after being incarcerated for
contempt because of his child support arrearages. 7
The
relationships between the mothers and fathers, fragile at their
beginnings, can be obliterated through the process. The hopes of
children to have fathers who are supportive and involved in their
lives are often dissolved. s
several forms of government cost recovery efforts.
For example, state
governments also engage in the questionable practice of seeking foster
children's Social Security benefits in order to reimburse the cost of foster care.
For a discussion of this practice and other government revenue maximization
efforts, see generally Daniel L. Hatcher, Foster Children Paying for Foster Care,
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1797 (2006).
5. As of 2005, there were 8,303,946 cases in the IV-D child support system
with assigned child support because the families currently or formerly received
welfare assistance. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, FY 2005 PRELIMINARY
REPORT tb1.2 (2006), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubS/2006/reports/
preliminaryJeportltable_2.html [hereinafter 2005 REPORT].
6. See, e.g., David L. Chambers, Fathers, the Welfare System, and the
Virtues and Perils of Child-Support Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575, 2594
(1995) ("Not surprisingly, a high proportion of the poorest children in this
country also have poor fathers."). By 2003, unpaid child support arrearages
reached over ninety billion dollars, and almost two-thirds of the obligors had
annual incomes of less than ten thousand dollars. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE STORY BEHIND THE
NUMBERS:
WHO
OWES
THE
CHILD
SUPPORT
DEBT?
1
(2004),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/lM/2004lim-04-04.htm
[hereinafter
STORY BEHIND THE NUMBERS].
7. These descriptions are aided by the author's past experiences in
developing a child support project at the Maryland Legal Aid Bureau. See
Daniel L. Hatcher & Hannah Lieberman, Breaking the Cycle of Defeat for
"Deadbroke" Noncustodial Parents Through Advocacy on Child Support Issues,
CLEARINGHOUSE REV., May-June 2003, at 5, 9.
8. See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform,
Child Support Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
325, 344 (2005) (explaining that the pursuit of increased child support
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And there is little gain to counter the loss because welfare cost
recovery is largely a fiscal failure. The goal is simple: reduce
government spending by recouping welfare costs from the person
who should have been providing such financial support in the first
place, the absent parent. Yet, as this Article reveals, the net
financial benefit to the government resulting from welfare cost
recovery is minimal and may actually be negative. 9 Further, the
small percentage of assigned support that is successfully collected is
diverted from the children and their families when they most need
it, decreasing their economic stability and increasing their likelihood
of needing welfare again in the future.
Moreover, in addition to the family conflict and fiscal failings,
welfare cost recovery also results in legal conflict. Reimbursing
welfare costs directly conflicts with serving the best interests of the
children, long recognized by the courts as the paramount purpose of
child support. The two goals simply cannot coexist. Every dollar
taken from a child in the name of welfare cost recovery is a dollar
that does not serve the best interests of the child. Yet, despite the
conflict, child support agencies attempt to serve both purposes
simultaneously.lO The result is a child support system with strands
of legal reasoning and policy goals continuously twisted around
themselves and hidden behind a wall of public relations. The two
lines of purpose are pulled out and presented to the public as
existing harmoniously side by side, yet behind them there is a
tangled and nonsensical legal mess.
An understanding of the conflict is aided by a look to the past.
The current child support system developed from competing
interests and purposes, a mixture of common law, divorce codes,
state poor laws, bastardy acts, and criminal nonsupport statues. l l
From this history emerged the two primary interests in child
support. While the government objective of reimbursing public
assistance was often recognized in early case law, courts began
simultaneously recognizing the best interests of children as the

collections "[has] had a number of unintended consequences that have adversely
impacted low-income families, particularly the relationship between fathers and
children in those families").
9. See infra Part III.B.1.
10. AM. PuB. HUMAN SERVS. AsS'N, CROSSROADS II: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
SOCIAL POLICY 91 (2005), available at http://www.aphsa.org/publicationsldod
crossroads2lcrossroads.pdf ("Today, the [child support] program straddles two
missions: retaining collections from and giving collections to families .... These
two missions also differ in philosophy as well as the underlying structure of how
the system is funded.").
11. See infra Part LA.
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primary purpose of child support. 12
The historical tensions
converged when Congress enacted Title IV-D of the Social Security
Act in 1974, creating a federal and state partnership to collect child
support and the beginnings of what is now simply known as the IVD child support system. 13 Although the new child support system
also began to provide services to families not on welfare, the primary
purpose of the program at its inception was government revenue
maximization via welfare cost recovery policies. 14
Today, high-level government child support officials recognize
the failings of welfare cost recovery, and they describe a shift in
priorities. No longer is cost recoupment the primary aim of child
support offices, explains the Federal Office of Child Support
15
Enforcement. Instead, the IV-D child support program is shifting
its focus toward the purpose that most of society presumes:
increasing financial support to children. 16 But although signs of the
changing mission are evident, the shift is far from complete. Recent
changes to the federal child support laws included in the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005 allow states increased opportunities and
incentives to provide more collected child support payments to
children rather than keeping the payments to reimburse welfare
costS.1 7 However, with an effective date of 2008 for the new state
options, it is unclear how many states will implement the changes.
And even if most states take advantage of the new options by
"passing through" at least some assigned child support back to
families, most assigned child support collections will likely still be
retained by the government. The pressure on states to pursue longstanding revenue streams is simply too great.
The conflict between state and child has existed since child
support's beginnings and continues today. The conflict raises
important legal and policy questions that go to the heart of what
child support is or should be about. However, few scholars,
advocates, or courts have thoroughly addressed the tension or the

12. See infra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
13. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, sec. 101(a), §§
451-460, 88 Stat. 2337, 2351-58 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
651-660 (2000».
14. See, e.g., HARRy D. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAL
PERSPECTIVE 318 (1981).
15. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: STRATEGIC PLAN 1
(2004),
available
at
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubsl20041
Strategic_Plan_FY2005-2009.pdf [hereinafter STRATEGIC PLAN).
16. [d.
17. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4, 141-45
(2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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legal morass that results. IS The Federal Office of Child Support
Enforcement describes the finding that half of all child support debt
is owed to the government rather than to families as provocative,
but largely ignored. The agency notes that "published reports about
the enormity of child support debt don't typically point out that half
is owed to the government," and questions "[h]ow would an
increased understanding of this story behind the numbers affect
policymaking?,,19 This Article seeks to tell the story. Part I sets out
the history of the competing interests and purposes of child support
in America, describes the framework of the current welfare cost
recovery system, and considers whether a shift in agency mission
from recouping welfare costs to supporting families is occurring.
Part II addresses the long ignored and unresolved legal questions
that result from the conflicting missions. Part III analyzes the
economic and noneconomic impacts of welfare cost recovery. In Part
IV, the Article concludes with suggestions for reform, including the
Article's primary conclusion that welfare cost recovery is a failed
effort-and should therefore end.
I.

HISTORY OF UNRESOLVED TENSIONS

The child support obligation grew from diverse ongms,
including early common law, state poor laws, divorce codes, bastardy
laws, and criminal nonsupport laws. The early purposes of child
support were as varied as the origins: to discourage the birth of
children out of wedlock, punish parents for failing to support their
children, reimburse private third parties, reimburse local
governments for public aid, protect the public from the risk of
supporting indigent children, and finally, to provide financial
18. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 6; Deborah Harris, Child Support for
Welfare Families: Family Policy Trapped in Its Own Rhetoric, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 619 (1988). Also, Vicki Turetsky, an advocate and expert on
child support policy at the Center for Law and Social Policy, has long described
concerns with the child support system's focus on cost recovery and has
advocated the need to change missions toward supporting families. See, e.g.,
Hearing on Fatherhood Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Congo 1 (1999) (statement of Vicki Turetsky,
Senior Staff Attorney, Center for Law and Social Policy), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/Legacy/humreS/106cong/4-27-99/4-27ture.htm
(discussing welfare cost recovery and the need to redirect assigned child support
back to children). See generally VICKI TvRETSKY, CTR. FOR LAw & SOC. POLICY,
You GET WHAT You PAY FOR: How FEDERAL AND STATE INVESTMENT DECISIONS
AFFECT
CHILD
SUPPORT
PERFORMANCE
1
(1998),
available
at
http://clasp.org/publications/you....get_what....You_pay.pdf (explaining the tension
between welfare cost recovery and providing child support directly to families
and describing a needed mission shift. from cost recovery to service delivery).
19. 2002 REPORT, supra note 1.

2007]

CHILD SUPPORT HARMING CHILDREN

1035

support directly to children and their mothers. As the various
obligations developed, a tension emerged between the societal
interest in supporting children and the simultaneous interest in
protecting society from the burden of supporting children. For well
over two hundred years, the conflict has continued.

Early History: Supporting Children or Protecting Society
The commentaries of Sir William Blackstone on the laws of
England are often cited as providing one of the first known
statements of the duty of parents to support their children. 20
Blackstone explained that the "duty of parents to provide for the
maintenance of their children, is a principle of natural law.'>2l The
obligation existed within a framework of three primary parental
duties for the purpose of promoting their children's welfare:
providing for the children's maintenance, protection, and
22
education.
Regarding the duty to provide for children's
maintenance, Blackstone reasoned that the parents "would be in the
highest manner injurious to their issue, if they only gave their
children life, that they might afterwards see them perish.,,23
Through the lens of Blackstone's commentaries, the moral child
support obligation clearly existed for the purpose of promoting the
interests of children. But despite the children's status as the
obvious beneficiaries of this "natural law" parental obligation, the
English common law did not provide children with a legal remedy to
enforce this right.24
In contrast to the unenforceable natural law obligation owed for
the benefit of children, an obligation for the benefit of protecting
society also existed in England-and was enforceable. With an aim
of indemnifying society from the burden of supporting indigent
children, the Elizabethan Poor Laws provided local parishes with
the right to seek support from absent fathers in order to reimburse
public aid provided to single mothers and children. 25
Thus,

A.

20. See, e.g., Deborah H. Bell, Child Support Orders: The Common Law
Framework-Part II, 69 MISS. L.J. 1063, 1064 (2000); Marsha Garrison,
Autonomy or Community? An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation,
86 CAL. L. REV. 41, 49 (1998); Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed:
Limits of Private Responsibility and the Public Interest, 24 FAM. L.Q. 1,6 (1990);
Drew D. Hansen, Note, The American Invention of Child Support: Dependency
and Punishment in Early American Child Support Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1123,
1133-34 (1999).
21. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *446.
22. Id. at *446-52.
23. Id. at *447.
24. Garrison, supra note 20, at 49; Hansen, supra note 20, at 1133-34.
25. Hansen, supra note 20, at 1134.
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competing purposes have existed since child support's English
beginnings: the natural law obligation, while unenforceable, existed
for the benefit of children, while the Elizabethan Poor Laws
obligation existed for the benefit of indemnifying society from the
cost of public aid for children.
In America, the child support obligation emerged in the
26
nineteenth century as a creation of the courts. While some courts
followed the English rule and refused to provide a legal remedy,
others followed the "more humane principle" that the duty of
parents to support their children should create a legally enforceable
27
obligation. One line of early American cases limited enforcement
to the reimbursement of "necessaries" provided by third parties. 28
The cases emphasized the rights of third parties seeking
reimbursement, but were reluctant to find that children or their
mothers could bring an action for child support directly.29 However,
another line of cases also emerged in the nineteenth century that
recognized a support obligation owed to mothers and children. As
early as 1808, courts began to order noncustodial parents to pay
financial support for their children as a part of divorce proceedings,30
and many states soon began formalizing such support obligations
through divorce codes. 31 By the 1930s, almost all states had such
child support statutes. 32
The tension born in England thus continued in America. While
the common law child support obligation was created to reimburse
third parties for necessaries, the child support obligation created
through divorce codes was for the benefit of the children. Language

26. See, e.g., id. at 1134-35.
27. Huke v. Huke, 1891 WL 2545, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1891); see also Donna
Schuele, Origins and Development of the Law of Parental Child Support, 27 J.
FAM. L. 807, 811-16 (1989) (explaining how some American courts agreed with
Blackstone that child support was a moral obligation but not legally
enforceable); Hansen, supra note 20, at 1134-35.
28. See, e.g., Pidgin v. Cram, 1836 WL 1271, at *3 (N.H. 1836); Tomkins v.
Tomkins, 1858 WL 4975, at *3 (N.J. Ch. 1858); Van Valkinburgh v. Watson, 13
Johns. 480, 480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816); see also Hansen, supra note 20, at 113437,1139.
29. Johnson v. Barnes, 29 N.W. 759, 759-60 (Iowa 1886) (recognizing a
father's child support obligation to third persons but not to wives); Huke, 1891
WL 2545, at *2 (noting that some American courts had developed a child
support obligation enforceable by third parties who provided necessaries for an
abandoned child but concluding that minor children could not enforce a child
support obligation directly).
30. Schuele, supra note 27, at 821 (discussing Stanton v. Willson, 1808 WL
85 (Conn. 1808».
31. Id. at 825 & n.68.
32. Id. at 834-35.
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regarding the interests of children emerged from the courts during
this time, setting the stage for the well-known best interests of the
child standard. In 1874, the Supreme Court ofIndiana described a
standard that focused on both the interests of the parents and the
33
children.
Then, in 1916, the Supreme Court of South Dakota
provided one of the earliest decisions finding the best interests of
children to be paramount in matters regarding child support, a
standard that could not be subordinated even to the interests or by
34
the agreement of the parents.
Still, some courts spoke of the
father's duty to support his children after divorce as a means of
ensuring his children did not become public burdens, implying that
serving the interests of children and protecting the public from the
cost of indigent children went hand-in-hand. 35
And as American child support obligations developed through
common law and divorce codes, other statutory support obligations
also emerged during the same time period, again with varied
purposes. State laws modeled on the Elizabethan Poor Laws of 1601
authorized towns to sue nonsupporting fathers in order to reimburse
36
public aid. Also, states began enacting desertion and nonsupport
statutes that made the failure of parents to support their children a
37
criminal act.
Bringing the criminal law into child support
proceedings served the goal of reimbursing public costs for indigent
children. However, the criminal nonsupport statutes also allowed
for child support payments directly to the mothers. Thus, the
33. Sullivan v. Learned, 1874 WL 6165, at *4 (Ind. 1874) (explaining that
courts possessed the power to order child support as a part of divorce
proceedings and that the support orders could be modified "as the best interests
of the parents and children may render necessary and proper").
34. Houghton v. Houghton, 157 N.W. 316, 317 (S.D. 1916) ("It is the welfare
of the children that the court is concerned with, not the wishes of either of the
parents, and we do now declare that parents are powerless to provide by
irrevocable contract what the future financial liability of either shall be with
relation to the support, maintenance, and education of the children."); see also
White v. Shalit, 1 A.2d 765, 767 (Me. 1938) (explaining that judgment on a
petition to modify custody or support will be controlled by the best interests of
the children, even if the parties join in the petition); Mallina v. Mallina, 4
N.Y.S.2d 27, 31 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1938) ("A child will not be permitted to be
deprived of its [maintenance and support) rights even if the deprivation is at
the hand of a parent or parents.").
35. See, e.g., Kell v. Kell, 161 N.W. 634, 636 (Iowa 1917) ("This [divorce)
statute is expressive of the policy of the state, which is interested in the
relations of the parties, the care and training of the children, and the possibility
of the latter becoming burdens on the public.").
36. Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin,
Development, and Present Status, Part I, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 283-84 (1964)
[hereinafter tenBroek Part Il; Hansen, supra note 20, at 1145-46.
37. Hansen, supra note 20, at 1145, 1149.
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purposes of the early criminal nonsupport laws were mixed. The
laws were designed to punish nonsupporting parents, protect
society, and provide direct assistance to children and their custodial
38
parents.
Along with the poor laws and criminal nonsupport laws, states
enacted bastardy statutes aimed at forcing putative fathers to
39
support their illegitimate children.
The statutes were both
criminal and civil in their focus and, like the nonsupport laws, their
purposes were mixed. For example, a Maryland court explained
that "[w]hile the prime object of the Maryland Bastardy Act is to
protect the public from the burden of maintaining illegitimate
children, it is so distinctly in the interest of the mother that she
becomes the beneficiary of it.,,40 For children born out of wedlock,
the bastardy acts essentially codified a conflict between state and
child. The statutes established a criminal or criminal-like offense
for the birth of illegitimate children and provided indemnity for the
public through bond requirements to protect the public from the
possibility of the children becoming public charges, yet also provided
a means of seeking child sUPP9rt for the children. Wrapped up in
the bastardy acts were the public's own financial interests and
interests in punishing the parents of children born out of wedlock,
as well as the interests of the mothers and children in receiving
support from the absent fathers.
Only a handful of courts grappled with the competing interests,
and the 1855 case of Perkins v. Mobley provides an early example.
In Perkins, a mother of a child born out of wedlock filed a complaint
against the alleged father under the state's bastardy act in order to
seek maintenance and support for the child. 41 Before the scheduled
trial, the alleged father reached an agreement with the mother to
pay her one hundred dollars in consideration of the mother filing a
42
notice of settlement and request to dismiss the complaint.
The
trial court refused to accept the settlement, and upholding the
decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio attempted to straddle the
public's interests and the interests of the child. 43 First, the "high
moral duty" of the father to pay support was explained as existing
for the purpose of protecting the public. 44 The court initially placed
38. Id. at 1147-48.
39. Id. at 1144.
40. Fiege v. Boehm, 123 A.2d 316, 321 (Md. 1956) ("Prosecutions for
bastardy are treated in Maryland as criminal proceedings, but they are actually
civil in purpose. ").
41. Perkins v. Mobley, 4 Ohio St. 668, 669 (1855).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 672-73.
44. Id. at 673.
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the greatest importance on the security that must be given to
protect the public, explaining that allowing the complainant to
prevent the recovery would eliminate the protection for the public
and therefore "defeat the leading object of the whole statute.'>45
However, the court then explained that the discretion in setting
child support awards under the statute should be controlled by what
is in the best interests of the child with the protection of the public
as "consequent.'>46
Thus, the court's circular reasoning left
unanswered whether protecting the public was really the "leading
object of the whole statute" or whether the best interests of the child
was the primary concern and the public interests only "consequent."
In Kentucky, a much clearer resolution to the conflict emerged
from a series of decisions holding that bastardy proceedings are not
for county relief, but for the benefit of the mother and to enforce the
natural duty a father owes to both the mother and child. 47 Similar
to the facts in Perkins, the 1832 decision of the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky in Burgen v. Straughan involved a mother's complaint
under the state's bastardy act and the question of whether a
promissory note between the alleged father and the mother for
48
purposes of settling the complaint was enforceable.
Contrary to
the bastardy act in Ohio, the Kentucky act provided the right to
seek support and maintenance only to the mother, with no
49
corresponding right provided to the town. Mter explaining how the
act's purpose was to enforce a natural right of the mother and child
and was not for the benefit of the county or to impose a criminal
sanction, the court elaborated on why the choice of whether to
pursue child support should belong to the mother:
[N]or can we perceive how it can be unlawful or
immoral, or inconsistent with the policy of the law,
for the mother of a bastard to agree with the father
that, if he will co-operate in the maintainance [sic] of
their child, she will not proceed under the bastardy
act . . . . It should not be deemed injurious to the
community or county. It is not the public duty of the
mother of an illegitimate child to assert her statutory
right. Her voluntary forbearance is no breach of any
moral or civil obligation. Her child may become a
burthen to her county; but this might happen, and
45. Id. at 674.
46. Id.
47. See Burgen v. Straughan, 30 Ky. (7 J.J. Marsh.) 583, 584 (Ky. 1832);
Stafford v. Withers, 20 Ky. (4 T.B. Mon.) 510, 511 (Ky. 1827); Schooler v.
Commonwealth, 16 Ky. (1 Litt. Sel. Cas.) 88 (Ky. 1809).
48. Burgen, 30 Ky. (7 J.J. Marsh.) at 583.
49. Id. at 585.
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would, perhaps, be more likely to occur, if such
contracts as that we are now considering should be
declared illegal and void. Many, in her condition,
might prefer all the wretchedness of destitution and
poverty, to a voluntary promulgation, in a county
court, of all the circumstances necessary
to coerce
50
contributions under the bastardy act.
Despite the outdated notions of the time regarding children
born out of wedlock, the Kentucky court provided a view towards the
purpose of child support that refused to discriminate between the
rich and poor and would be considered enlightened today, let alone
in 1832:
The act of 1795 was intended to benefit her. It does
not apply to those only who are poor; but embraces
the rich as well as the poor. It is not because the
mother may be poor that the act of 1795 allows her to
compel the father to contribute to the support of their
spurious offspring; but it is because she should have
the right to coerce such contribution against the
father, whether she be rich or poor. For his duty to
maintain his own child does not depend on her
inability to do it, but on the natural relation which he
sustains to a helpless being whom he contributed to
bring into the world. 51
The Kentucky view was a rarity and, as child support doctrine
continued to develop, the conflict between competing interests
became even more entrenched. In the courts, the trend continued
towards explicitly recognizing the best interests of the child as the
paramount concern in child support proceedings. 52 Simultaneously,

50. Id. at 584-85.
51. Id. at 585-86.
52. Supra note 34; see, e.g., Reiter v. Reiter, 278 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Ark.
1955) (noting that "a court of equity has the power to modify an award for child
support when required by changed conditions and the best interests of the
child"); Kelleher v. Kelleher, 214 N.E.2d 139, 142 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966) (explaining
that trial court's order refusing to increase child support "must be set aside on
review where the record fails to show that the welfare and best interests of the
children was the controlling consideration"); Leeming v. Leeming, 490 P.2d 342,
345 (Nev. 1971) ("[W]ife cannot enter into a stipulation or agreement that binds
the court concerning child custody and support, for 'it is not the rights of the
parties which are to be determined, but the best interests of the child.'" (quoting
Atkins v. Atkins, 259 P. 288, 289 (Nev. 1927)));; Conway v. Dana, 318 A.2d 324,
326 (Pa. 1974) ("In the matter of child support we have always expressed as the
primary purpose the best interest and welfare of the child."); Ex parte
Lindeman, 492 S.W.2d 599, 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) ("Ordinarily in cases
involving custody and child support cases, the best interest of the child or
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the efforts of states and localities to seek child support as a means of
reim bursing welfare costs increased dramatically as the federal
government soon joined the pursuit.

B.

Emergence of Federal Control
Congress first asserted its control over child support matters
with the primary goal of reducing the cost of welfare to the
government. 53 The federal role began in 1950 with an amendment to
the Social Security Act requiring state welfare agencies to notify law
enforcement officials when a family received Aid to Families with
Dependent Children ("AFDC") for a child who was abandoned or
deserted. 54 Additional amendments in 1965 and 1967 increased the
ability of state welfare agencies to obtain the address and
employment information of noncustodial parents and required
states to create single government units to pursue child support on
behalf of children receiving AFDC. 55
The initial federal requirements did not explicitly condition
eligibility for AFDC upon any action by the applicant regarding
child support. 56 State attempts to enforce cooperation requirements
for AFDC were therefore struck down because of the absence of any
federal authority or mandate. 57 Then, Congress enacted Title IV-D
of the Social Security Act in 1974, which created a federal and state
partnership to collect child support. 58 The legislation set out the
welfare cost recovery framework that still exists today, including the
requirement that welfare applicants cooperate with establishing and

children is the primary concern.").
53. Krause, supra note 20, at 6; Shannon Bettis Nakabayashi, A "Dual
System" of Family Law Revisited: Current Inequities in California's Child
Support Law, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 593, 602 (2001).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1l) (1988) (repealed 1996); see also OFFICE OF CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ESSENTIALS FOR
ATTORNEYS IN CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT A-I app. A (2002), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubS/2002lreports/essentials/appendix_a.h
tml [hereinafter ESSENTIALS FOR A'ITORNEYS) (noting the legislative history of
child support enforcement).
55. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. (79 Stat. 286) 305, 449-50; Social Security Amendments of 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-248, 1967 U.s.C.C.A.N. (81 Stat. 821) 923, 1017-19); see also
ESSENTIALS FOR ATTORNEYS, supra note 54, at 9 (discussing the amendments).
56. See Jacqueline M. Fontana, Cooperation and Good Cause: Greater
Sanctions and the Failure to Account for Domestic Violence, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S
L.J. 367, 370-71 (2000).
57. Id. at 371-72.
58. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. (88 Stat. 2337) 2716, 2732-40; Fontana, supra note 56, at 372;
Murphy, supra note 8, at 345 & n.85.
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pursuing child support and assign the resulting child support rights
to the government. 59
The Senate Finance Committee report on the legislation
illustrates the lawmakers' struggle to harmonize the government's
fiscal interests with the interests of children. The report describes
the legislation as championing the rights of children-that "all
children have the right to receive support from their fathers" and
that the legislation "is designed to help children attain this right.,,60
However, the main goal of the legislation was the oppositerequiring mothers and children to assign their child support rights
in order to recoup the government costs of welfare assistance. 61 At
one point, the report begins to honestly describe assigned child
support obligations as simply "a debt owed by the absent father to
the State.,,62 But the same paragraph then circles back to the
children, attempting to persuade that the children's child support
rights-although already assigned to the government-can still be
protected: "a provision has been included to assure that the rights of
the wife and child are not discharged in bankruptcy merely because
the support obligation is a debt to the State.,,63 Then, almost as an
afterthought, the legislation also tacked on the availability of
enforcement services for parents not on AFDC and who were not
required to assign the payments to the government. 64 Thus, the
primary focus of the IV-D program in taking child support away
from families on welfare developed simultaneously with a secondary
effort to provide child support to the families not on welfare. The
IV-D program was born in conflict.

59. Social Services Amendments of 1974 § 101(a), 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2732-40 (relevant sections codified at 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2)-(3) (2000».
60. S. REP. No. 93-1356 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133, 8146.
61. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 108TH CONG., 2004 GREEN
BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 8-67 (Comm. Print 2004),
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmprints/green/2004.html [hereinafter
GREEN BOOK] ("When Congress enacted the Child Support Enforcement
program in 1975, the floor debate shows that members of the House and Senate
supported the program primarily because retaining welfare collections would
help offset welfare expenditures.").
62. See S. REP. No. 93-1356 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133,
8153.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 8158 (explaining that although the legislation's primary focus is
"establishing paternity and collecting support for children getting AFDC
payments," the Committee recognized that providing support enforcement
services might also help families "avoid the necessity of applying for welfare in
the first place").
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Dual Systems Merge
In 1964, ten years before the creation of the IV-D child support
program, Jacobus tenBroek described child support in California as
65
a dual system.
One public system existed for poor families
receiving AFDC benefits that was "administered through state and
local agencies and subject to continuous legislative attention" and
"deals with expenditure and conservation of public funds and is
heavily political and measurably penal.,,66 The other system,
tenBroek explained, was a private judicially administered system
for the non poor focused "on the rights and responsibilities of family
members, and is civil, nonpolitical, and less penal.,,67
The dual system described by tenBroek presents a stark
portrayal of the historical biases and inequalities in the
development of child support. The distinctions clarify the simplistic
and widely held belief that child support is uniformly good and, if
strictly enforced, equally beneficial to all children and families. As
multiple scholars have noted, much of tenBroek's description is still
very accurate today.68 However, given the historical development
and converging interests within the various forms of child support,
the "dual system" description is somewhat oversimplified. The
reality of child support is a more complex and disorganized
compilation of competing legal obligations. Although the primary
inequalities lie between the child support obligations owed to the
public to reimburse welfare assistance and the private child support
obligations owed between parents, it is important to understand the
several strands of support obligations that have been sewn together
with a common labe1. 69
C.

65. See generally tenBroek Part I, supra note 36; Jacobus tenBroek,
California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present
Status, Part II, 16 STAN. L. REV. 900 (1964) [hereinafter tenBroek Part Il];
Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin,
Development, and Present Status, Part III, 17 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1965)
[hereinafter tenBroek Part Ill].
66. tenBroek Part I, supra note 36, at 257-58.
67. Id. at 258.
68. See, e.g., Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. KAN.
L. REV. 229, 237-41 (2000); Harris, supra note 18, at 630; Amy E. Hirsch,
Incoming Deeming in the AFDC Program: Using Dual Track Family Law to
Make Poor Women Poorer, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 713, 735 (1988);
N akabayashi, supra note 53, at 593-94.
69. In fact, tenBroek himself notes that his dual system description may be
oversimplified at times. See tenBroek Part I, supra note 36, at 257 (describing
how California family law dealing with children "derives from four principal
sources: the Elizabethan Poor Law, the Aid to Families With Dependent
Children Law (AFDC), the California codes of 1872, and the common law"
(footnotes omitted».
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Moreover, the dual systems described by tenBroek have now
merged under one roof. Since the enactment of the IV-D child
support system in 1974, the federal and state agency partnership
now "serves" both those families receiving welfare assistance and
70
those who do not. Child support still continues to exist outside of
the IV-D system since individuals can decide to pursue child support
through the courts without involvement from the IV-D child support
offices. However, one of the clear divisions described by tenBroek no
longer exists. Private child support obligations between parents
were initially administered solely by the courts and with little
legislative oversight, while the child support obligations to
reimburse public aid were administered through state and local
agencies with heavy legislative control. Although the different
functions of the dual system still exist, both forms of child support
are now administered under one heavily regulated, government-run
system.

D.

Welfare Cost Recovery Today: The Conflict Continues
Since the creation of the IV-D child support system, several
additional modifications have been enacted with the goal of
increasing child support collections. 71 Many of the most significant
changes occurred in 1996 with the passage of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
("PRWORA") and the replacement of the AFDC program with a new
block grant program, TANF.72 With some alterations, TANF
continues the main framework of welfare cost recovery, the child
support assignment and cooperation requirements. The Federal
Office of Child Support Enforcement has recently described a shift
in priorities from welfare cost recovery to providing more child
support to families, and new provisions in the Deficit Reduction Act
of 2005 allow states greater flexibility in serving that shifting
mission. However, as this Section of the Article explains, the policy
assertions do not yet match state practices-and a complete shift in
Although in different times, subject matter areas, and degrees
there has been, and still is, some intermingling of provisions
and concepts among all four of these legal complexes, it is
apparent that the major gap lies between the two public aid
laws on one hand and the codes and common law on the other,
rather than between the members of each of the pairs.
Id.
70. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
71. See ESSENTIALS FOR ATTORNEYS, supra note 54, at A-I to A-13.
72. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 101-116, 110 Stat. 2105, 2110--85 (1996); see
Murphy, supra note 8, at 328 & n.14.
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priorities is unlikely under the current framework.

1. Current Framework
Federal law requires states receIvmg TANF grants to deny
applications for welfare assistance to families who do not assign
their child support rights to the State. 73 Successful collections of the
assigned child support are generally kept by the state and federal
governments to reimburse the cost of providing welfare assistance.
In order for the assignment requirement to be effective, welfare
applicants are also required to cooperate in the establishment and
enforcement of the assigned child support obligations. 74 Under prior
AFDC rules, the failure to cooperate resulted in a reduction but not
75
a complete loss of welfare assistance. Under TANF, the sanction is
harsher. Now, when an applicant fails to meet the child support
cooperation requirements, the applicant and her family can lose all
benefits. 76
a. Reasons for Noncooperation. A mother applying for TANF
assistance may have several reasons for desiring to avoid the
establishment of paternity and enforcement of assigned child
support obligations. She may simply not want her child to know the
identity of the father or have the father be part of the child's life. 77
Additionally, she may fear retaliation in the form of domestic
violence toward herself or her child or in the form of custody
litigation where the absent parent seeks custody in order to avoid
78
the child support obligation. Most of the research and advocacy
regarding the child support cooperation requirement has focused on
the concerns with domestic violence,79 and the concern obviously
warrants the focus. But another reason for noncooperation, often
ignored but warranting increased attention, is noncooperation based
73. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3) (2000).
74. Id. § 654(29). Also, a similar cost recoupment strategy exists to recover
costs for children in foster care. See § 671(a)(17).
75. KRAUSE, supra note 14, at 356.
76. See 42 U.s.C. § 608(a)(2) (requiring that when a TANF applicant fails
to cooperate with child support enforcement, the state must reduce the
assistance grant by at least twenty-five percent and may deny all assistance to
the family).
77. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
CLIENT COOPERATION WITH CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: CHALLENGES AND
STRATEGIES TO IMPROVEMENT 6 (2000), available at http://oig.hhs.gov
loei/reports/oei-06-98-00041.pdf [hereinafter CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES].
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Fontana, supra note 56, at 369; Naomi Stern, Battered by the
System: How Advocates Against Domestic Violence Have Improved Victims'
Access to Child Support and TANF, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 47, 59-60
(2003).
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upon the mother and child's desired relationship with the father.
Many mothers desire a positive relationship with the father and
may already receive various forms of in-kind or informal support.
Thus, they may seek to protect the father-and the relationshipfrom the child support obligation. In fact, both child support and
welfare office caseworkers frequently report the mother's concern
with losing informal support and the desire to protect the
noncustodial parent as reasons for noncooperation, and those
reasons are reported substantially more often than the fear of
domestic violence. so
b. Good Cause Exception. Due to the many valid reasons for
noncooperation, an exception to the child support cooperation
requirement is provided. Under AFDC, a good cause exception to
the child support cooperation requirement was mandated by federal
law, and the specifics of the exception were spelled out in a
subsequent regulation. sl TANF retains the good cause exception but
leaves it to the states to define the exceptions criteria as long as the
best interests of the children are taken into account.S2 Despite
discretion under TANF, most states have continued to simply follow
the definitions of good cause previously provided under the AFDC
regulations. s3 The definitions are narrow, focusing primarily on
80. See CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES, supra note 77, at 6 tb1.2. Of the
possible reasons for noncooperation, 94% of surveyed child support caseworkers
report the mother's desire to protect the noncustodial parent and 88% report
the fear of losing informal support, compared to 63% reporting the fear of
domestic violence. Id. For the surveyed welfare office caseworkers, the
numbers are similar: 92% report the desire to protect the noncustodial parent
and 88% report the fear of losing informal support, while 73% report the fear of
domestic violence. Id.
81. Good Cause for Refusing to Cooperate, 43 Fed. Reg. 45,742 (Oct. 3,
1978); Fontana, supra note 56, at 373-74.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 654(29) (2000) (explaining that the cooperation
requirements are "subject to good cause and other exceptions which ... shall, at
the option of the State, be defined, taking into account the best interests of the
child, and applied in each case"). Similar to the good cause exception in TANF,
states are provided with discretion in foster care cases. Federal law requires
that "where appropriate, all steps will be taken ... to secure an assignment to
the State of any rights to support on behalf of each child receiving foster care
maintenance payments." Id. § 671(a)(17).
"To determine if a case is
'appropriate' to refer to the title IV-D agency," federal guidance explains, "the
State should evaluate it on an individual basis, considering the best interests of
the child and the circumstances of the family." CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T.
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CmLD WELFARE POLICY MANuAL 377 (2007),
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/j2ee/programs/cb/laws_policies/laws/cwpm
/pdflcwpmall.pdf. Suggested factors to consider include whether reunification is
a goal and whether the state-owed child support obligation would be a barrier.
Id.
83. Fontana, supra note 56, at 375 (quoting Vicki Turetsky & Susan Notar,
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threats to the safety of the custodial parent or child and
a4
circumstances where adoption is contemplated.
With the transition from AFDC to TANF, the good cause
exception was weakened through the elimination of notice
requirements to the custodial parents and with a shift in the agency
authority to decide whether good cause is present. Under AFDC,
written notice regarding the good cause exception was required. a5
TANF includes no specific notice requirements or any standards
whatsoever for the processing and consideration of good cause
claims. a6
Also, TANF shifted responsibility for good cause
determination from state welfare agencies to the child support
agencies. a7 The transition is significant because the state welfare
agencies-when operating well-have a more holistic view of the
welfare applicants' circumstances. The agencies often assist the
applicants through the process of applying for several types of
benefits and inquire about the need for referrals to various
community services. In contrast, child support offices are focused
almost solely on the single goal of enforcing support obligations and
are thus much further removed from the complexities and hardships
of welfare applicants' lives. aa
With the narrow definitions of good cause, the lack of notice
requirements to inform applicants about their ability to request
good cause exceptions, and the shift in agency authority to consider
the claims, it is not surprising that the number of exceptions
granted from the child support cooperation requirements are
limited. 89 Yet while the exceptions are usually few, the numbers

Models for Safe Child Support Enforcement (Ctr. for Law & Soc. Policy), Oct.
1999, at 13).
84. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., CLIENT COOPERATION WITH CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: USE OF GOOD
CAUSE EXCEPTIONS 4 (2000), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oeilreports/oei-06-9800043.pdf [hereinafter GoOD CAUSE EXCEPTIONS] (explaining that the federal
definitions of good cause include "cases of domestic violence, when conception
was the result of forcible rape or incest, when adoption is pending, or when the
client is consulting with a social service agency regarding the possibility of
adoption").
85. Stern, supra note 79, at 56.
86. See id. at 57.
87. Id. at 52.
88. Id.
89. See GOOD CAUSE EXCEPTIONS, supra note 84, at 2 ("States report
receiving very few requests for exceptions and granting even fewer."). Another
possibility for avoiding the good cause requirements is also available under the
federal Family Violence Option ("FVO"). See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (2000). In
addition to increasing screening, confidentiality, and referrals for domestic
violence victims, the FVO provided under TANF allows states to waive certain
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vary widely from state to state. For example, Michigan provided
5656 good cause exceptions in 2002, compared to 6875
determinations of noncooperation. 90 In contrast, Tennessee granted
only twenty good cause exceptions while determining the
91
noncooperation to be inexcusable in 17,180 cases.

2. Irreconcilable Missions: Talk of Shift
The FY 2005-2009 National Child Support Enforcement
Strategic Plan begins with a description of a changing mission, a
shift in priority to supporting families: "Child Support is no longer
primarily a welfare reimbursement, revenue-producing device for
the Federal and State governments; it is a family-first program,
intended to ensure families' self-sufficiency by making child support
a more reliable source of income.,,92 The strategic plan explains
signs of success in the changing mission, noting that "[m]ore than
ever, the money we collect on behalf of children actually goes to
children.,,93 The American Public Human Services Association
("APHSA"), the association that represents the interests of state and
local child support agencies across the country, lists the shifting
mission as one of the primary challenges facing the child support
94
program.
The challenge, according to APHSA, is that the two
other TANF requirements, including child support cooperation. See Stem,
supra note 79, at 57-58. However, similar to the good cause exception, effective
utilization of the FVO waiver is limited. See id. at 58-60.
90. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT FY 2002 AND FY 2003
ANNUAL REpORT To CONGRESS tbls.69 & 70 (2005), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programslcse/pubsl2005/reportslannual_reportlindex.ht
ml [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT].
91. Id.
92. STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 15, at 1.
93. Id.
94. AM. PuB. HUMAN SERV'S AsS'N, supra note 10, at 91.
Over the years, passing on child support collections and
providing other services to families have been seen as
increasingly important. Today, the program straddles two
missions: retaining collections from and giving collections to
families. . . . These two missions also differ in philosophy as
well as the underlying structure of how the system is funded.
Cost-recovery is based on automated responses while family
support is grounded in client contact, collections directly to the
family, and the provision of support services. Also, the
fundamental funding source for the administration of the
federal program was designed to be the state and federal share
of collections made on behalf of current and former welfare
families; the newer family support model means that the
family receives the collections.
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missions of "retaining collections from and giving collections to
95
families" are directly at odds. Such recognItion of the conflict and
need to realign the competing missions is encouraging. However,
despite the described shift in government priorities and a long
overdue recognition of the obvious-that child support is best used
to help children and their families-welfare cost recovery continues
to be a centerpiece of child support and welfare policy.
a. Changing Mission? After a long period of growth in child
support cases with assigned support ("CSE TANF cases"), the
number began to decline as stricter TANF eligibility rules were
enacted in 1996. 96 But even with the decline in CSE TANF cases,
strengthened enforcement tools initially resulted in increased
97
welfare cost recovery collections. Then, as the CSE TANF caseload
continued to decline as fewer and fewer families continued to receive
welfare, a slow decline in child support collections retained by the
government began in 2003. 98 During the same time period, the
proportion of child support collections distributed to families rather
than retained by the government has significantly increased. 99
Signs of a shifting mission are apparent in the numbers, yet
how much ofthe shift is purposeful is unclear. For example, it is not
clear whether the recent decrease in welfare cost recovery
collections is primarily due to reduced welfare cost recovery efforts
or simply the smaller pool of CSE TANF cases from which to collect
the assigned support. 100 And the increase in collections in CSE nonTANF cases while welfare cost recovery collections decrease may
have more to do with the demographics of the populations served
and an increasing usage of child support services by nonwelfare
families. In cases where custodial parents are current or former
welfare recipients and therefore have very little or no income, the

Id.
95. Id.
96. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: EFFECTS
OF DECLINING WELFARE CASELOADS ARE BEGINNING TO EMERGE 5-7 (1999),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99105.pdf.
97. Id. at 9.
9B. See 2005 REPORT, supra note 5, at fig.B.
99. Id.
100. During this time, a "families first" policy was also implemented that
had an impact on distributing more collections to families. The policy changed
distribution rules, providing that when child support was collected in cases with
both assigned and nonassigned support obligations, the collections should be
distributed toward the obligations owed to families before the State receives its
share-but with a significant exception for collections through tax refund
intercepts. 42 U.S.C. § 657(a) (2000); see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra
note 96, at 21-22.
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noncustodial parents are often also poor. 101 Welfare fathers are
simply much less likely to have the ability to meet their child
support obligations than fathers who are better off. Any payments
that are received from welfare fathers tend to be smaller amounts.
Further, when both parents are poor, the resulting monthly child
support orders are very low compared to cases where the parents
are better off. 102
On a public relations level, some state child support offices
apparently attempt to conceal the continued welfare recoupment
mission from the public. For example, the North Carolina state
child support agency leads its public description with a simple and
singular mission to help children: "To consistently collect as much
child support money as possible for the benefit of North Carolina's
children.,,103 Only upon digging deeper into the policy manual used
by agency staff are the dual and competing missions of the state
child support agency made clear. l04
The current federal child support incentive system also provides
insight and mixed signals regarding the changing mission. Ten
years ago, Congress passed the Child Support Performance and
Incentive Act of 1998, which included significant revisions to the
past structure of federal child support incentive payments to
states. 105 The legislation removed the prior caps on incentive
payments for child support collections in non-TANF cases and, in
doing so, increased the state incentives to collect child support
payments owed to families. 106
However, the legislation also

101. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
102. See generally Marsha Garrison, Child Support Policy: Guidelines and
Goals, 33 FAM. L.Q. 157 (1999).
103. N.C. Div. of Soc. Servs., N.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Child
Support Enforcement, http://www.dhhs.state.nc.usldsslcselindex.htm (last
visited Oct. 17,2007).
104. The manual explains the reality that when "children are receiving
Work First Family Assistance (WFFA), the debt of child support is owed to the
state by virtue of the Assignment of Rights to Support" and "[clhild support that
is collected for WFFA children is retained by the state and treated as a
reimbursement to WFFA funds." N.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT POLICY MANuAL, http://info.dhhs.state.nc.uslolml
manualsldsslcselmanlCSEcB-01.htm#P36_1335 (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
Thus, the agency is only helping the "children who are not receiving WFFA," for
whom "the child support is paid to the client (custodial parent or caretaker)."
Id.
105. Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105200, 112 Stat. 645 (1998).
106. See Child Support Enforcement Program; Incentive Payments, Audit
Penalties, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,178, 82,178 (Dec. 27, 2000) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pts. 302, 304-05). The final rule implements sections of the Child
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continued a heightened focus on welfare cost recovery by the
"double-weighting of collections in Current Assistance and Former
Assistance cases when calculating the collection base.,,107 The
Department of Health and Human Services explained multiple
purposes behind the double weighting: "to assist TANF recipients to
leave welfare and to help them achieve self sufficiency" because
"collection in TANF and former TANF cases is generally more
difficult than in non-TANF cases" and because "collections in TANF
cases provides direct savings to the state and federal
governments.,,108
As the explanation of the purposes of the
legislation indicate, the changes to the incentive structure
demonstrate a shift toward encouraging child support payments to
families but simultaneously continue an ongoing focus on
reimbursing welfare costs.
Thus, the signs of change in the mission of child support
enforcement have been mixed. Soon, however, recently enacted
federal legislative changes will provide increased opportunities for
states to distribute more child support to families rather than keep
the payments to reimburse welfare costs.
b.
Child Support Provisions in the Deficit Reduction Act of
2005. When TANF replaced AFDC in 1996, the new welfare block
109
grant program was set to expire, unless reauthorized, in 2002.
When the deadline arrived, the reauthorization process was jammed
by contentious political debate. no Thus, the TANF program was
simply extended year to year without substantial change. l l l But
change has now come with the enactment of the Deficit Reduction
Act of 2005 ("DRA,,).n2
The new law contains a tightening of the TANF rules, including
increased work requirements for recipients and stricter rules for

Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998 and explains that under the
prior incentive structure, "the amount of non-TANF incentives [was] capped at
115 percent of the TANF incentive earned." [d.
107. [d. at 82,183.
108. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., SECRETARY'S REPORT ON THE
PRORAcT (1997),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programsicse/pollDCIJ1997/dcl9715.htm.
109. Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the
Privatization of Dependency, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'y & L. 415, 474 n.239
(2005).
110. See Noah Zatz, Welfare to What?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1166-73
(2006) (describing the political and policy debate).
111. Cossman, supra note 109, at 474 n.239.
112. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S. C.).
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states to meet required work participation rates.1I3 In addition to
the more stringent TANF rules, the DRA also includes increased
discretion for states regarding certain child support "pass through"
and distribution rules. 1l4
When child support is assigned to the government as a result of
the welfare cost recovery rules, states must share a significant
1I5
Under
portion of the collections with the federal government.
AFDC, states were initially required to "pass through" the first fifty
dollars of assigned child support collections back to the custodial
families. 116 TANF eliminated this requirement but still allowed
states the option to pass through part of the assigned child support
owed to the states. 1I7 The states could not, however, pass through
any of the portion of assigned support that was owed to the federal
government. liS Mter the mandatory pass through was changed to
an option under TANF, more than half of the states stopped passing
through any portion of assigned support back to families. 1I9
Under the DRA, the mandate has not been reinstated, but
states will be given increased incentives to pass through more
assigned support. Once -the law becomes effective, if a state elects to
pass through assigned support and disregard the passed through
support when determining TANF financial eligibility, the federal
government will participate in the pass through by waiving a

113. Id. at §§ 7101-7102, 120 Stat. 135-37; see also CTR. ON BUDGET &
POLICY PRIORITIES & CTR. FOR LAw & SOC. POLICY, IMPLEMENTING THE TANF
CHANGES IN THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT: ''WIN-WIN'' SOLUTIONS FOR FAMILIES
AND STATES 7-14 (2006), available at http://www.cbpp.org/5-9-06tanf.pdf
[hereinafter TANF CHANGES].
114. TANF CHANGES, supra note 113, at 65-70.
115. The percentage of assigned support collections a state must share with
the federal government is determined by the state's medical assistance federal
matching rate. 42 U.S.C. § 657(c)(2)-(3) (2000).
116. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 102, 102 Stat. 2343,
2346 (1988); see Murphy, supra note 8, at 371 n.221.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(I)(B).
118. Id. § 657(a)(I)(A).
119. PAULA ROBERTS & MICHELLE VINSON, CTR. FOR LAw & SOC. POLICY,
STATE POLICY REGARDING PASs-THROUGH AND DISREGARD OF CURRENT MONTH'S
CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTED FOR FAMILIES RECEIVING TANF-FuNDED CASH
AsSISTANCE
(2004),
available
at
http://www.clasp.org/publications/
pass_thru3.pdf. However, a recent update to the Center for Law and Social
Policy report indicates the number of states again starting to pass through
some assigned child support to families has slowly started to increase. JAN
JUSTICE, CTR. FOR LAw & SOC. POLICY, STATE POLICY REGARDING PASs-THROUGH
AND DISREGARD OF CURRENT MONTH'S CHILD SUPPORT COLLECTED FOR FAMILIES
RECEIVING TANF-FuNDED
CASH
AsSISTANCE
(2007),
available at
http://clasp.org/publications/pass_through_2007juneOl.pdf.
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portion of the federal share. 12o Thus, if a state is currently passing
through fifty dollars of assigned child support back to families, the
new law will allow the state to increase the pass-through amount at
reduced state cost because a portion of the pass-through amount will
come from the federal share.
In addition to the pass-through incentives, the DRA also
includes an important change to the child support distribution
rules. 121 Currently, when a family leaves welfare and a portion of
child support arrearages are owed to the government and a portion
of the arrearages and current support payments are owed to the
family, the distribution rules generally require that any payments
go to the family first.122 However, a significant exception to the
"families first" policy requires that child support arrearages
collected through federal tax refund intercepts be directed to the
government first.123 This exception is significant because the tax
refund intercepts have been the most effective enforcement tool for
TANF families. 124 Under the DRA, the mandatory exception will
change to a state option, allowing states the flexibility to also start
paying families first out of tax refund intercepts. 125
Thus, the DRA provides significant new flexibility for states to
begin providing more child support to children rather than retaining
the payments to reimburse welfare costs. However, when the
changes become effective in 2008, the extent to which states will
take advantage of the options is unclear. When flexibility was
integrated into the program in the past-when the mandatory fiftydollar pass through became a state option-most states stopped
passing through any assigned support to families whatsoever.126
Today, welfare cost recovery is entrenched in the state mindset of
120. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7301, 120 Stat. 4,
143 (2006) (explaining that the federal government will waive the federal share
up to one hundred dollars of passed through child support for one child and two
hundred dollars for two or more children).
121. [d. § 7301, 120 Stat. at 141-45.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(2)(B).
123. [d. § 657(a)(2)(B)(iv).
124. Hearing on Child Support Enforcement Reforms Before the Subcomm.
on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Congo (2000)
(statement of Wendell Primus, Director of Income Security., Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities), http://waysandmeans.house.govllegacylhumresl106cong!
5-18-00/5-18prim.htm (explaining that in 2000, "[albout one-third of all arrears
collections occur through the federal tax refund intercept, but two-thirds of
arrears collections for families on welfare are collected through the federal tax
refund intercept").
125. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7301, 120 Stat. 4,
141-42 (2006).
126. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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seeking to maximize revenues to reimburse state spending. The
new incentives in the DRA will hopefully encourage more states to
pass through at least some assigned support, but it is likely that the
welfare cost recovery goals of most states will continue at or near
full strength 127-as will the resulting conflicts.
II. QUESTIONS FROM THE CONFLICT
As long as children's interests in receiving child support are
served by a system that simultaneously pursues the government's
fiscal interests in enforcing child support obligations to reimburse
welfare costs, inevitable conflict will continue. And as the same
child support system strives to achieve missions that are directly at
odds, legal confusion will result. Although the conflicting missions
result in several significant legal questions that go to the core of
child support's purpose, the questions have received little attention.
This Part of the Article begins an exploration of some of the
questions, to start uncovering the legal confusion and
nonsensicalness that is present in a system where something called
"child support" can cause harm to children. 128

127. However, a good sign for the changing mission is present in the recent
report by the Center for Law and Social Policy, which illustrates an increasing
number of states deciding (or contemplating) to pass through some assigned
support back to the families. See supra note 119.
128. Several other legal questions result from the conflicting missions in
addition to those addressed in this Part of the Article. For example, the
attorneys representing the IV-D child support agencies face conflicts of interest.
See generally Barbara Glesner Fines, From Representing "Clients" to Serving
"Recipients": Transforming the Role of the N-D Child Support Enforcement
Attorney, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2155 (1999). Legal concerns may exist regarding
state agency utilization of private for-profit contractors to pursue the competing
goals. The increasing use of computer automated agency actions may conflict
with necessary individualized discretion. Also, the statutory guidelines used to
establish initial child support amounts generally do not contemplate the
circumstances of assigned support, where the noncustodial parent will owe the
support to the state rather than to the custodial parent. A conflict arises when
applying the guidelines to assigned child support cases because the guidelinesand judicial discretion in the application of the guidelines-are supposed to be
guided by the best interests of the child standard. Under federal law, the
guideline amounts are presumed to be correct, but courts have discretion to
deviate when the guideline'S support amount would be "unjust or inappropriate"
and contrary to the best interests of the child. 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(g) (2006). If
the best interests of the children are the true guide, then every case with
assigned child support would seem to require a downward deviation from the
guidelines-if not an order amount set at zero-so that less money is taken
from the children.
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Whose Interests are Paramount?
Under welfare cost recovery, c~ild support obligations are
assigned to the State to reimburse welfare costs. The obvious
purpose is to serve the State's fiscal interests. However, in case
after case across the country, the best interests of the child standard
is repeatedly touted as the controlling legal standard in all
proceedings and questions regarding child support,129 and the
standard continues to be applied in cases with assigned support. 130
The question is therefore clear: when the State's fiscal interests
conflict with the best interests of the child, whose interests are
paramount? Despite the importance of the question and its
persistent presence in every single case of assigned child support,
few courts have addressed or even acknowledged the conflict.

A.

1. Continued Mixed Messages
In Department of Revenue v. Pealatere, the Supreme Court of
Alaska held that even when child support had been assigned to the
State to pursue its interests in reimbursing welfare costs, the best
interests of the children could still be considered. 131 Rather than
addressing the overarching question of which interest is ultimately
paramount, the court simply concluded that in cases with assigned
child support the children's best interests can still be a factor to help
.
t ances. 132
gUl'd e th e court'In some clrcums

129. See supra notes 34, 52.
130. See, e.g., Wehunt v. Ledbetter, 875 F.2d 1558, 1570 (11th Cir. 1989)
(noting that the "state must undertake the establishment of paternity and the
establishment and enforcement of support obligations for all AFDC children
unless it is against the best interests of the child to do so"); Green v.
Sollenberger, 656 A.2d 773, (Md. 1995) (noting that the court '''cannot be
handcuffed in the exercise of [its] duty to act in the best interests of a child by
any understanding between parents"') (quoting Stancill v. Stancill, 408 A.2d
1030, 1033 (Md. 1979»; In re Joshua W., 617 A.2d 1154, 1161 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1993) (noting that child support owed to the State after children had been
placed in foster care cannot be set higher than the guideline's amount without a
finding as to why it would be in the children's best interests to do so); Dep't of
Revenue v. C.M.J., 731 N.E.2d 501, 510 (Mass. 2000) ("We agree that a child
support order that further impoverishes the household of the children the order
was meant to support cannot be in the best interests of those children.").
131. 996 P.2d 84,86 (Alaska 2000).
132. Id. The parties in Pealatere divorced and agreed that the noncustodial
mother would not be required to pay child support for the minor son, and she
agreed to relinquish any claims to the custodial father's tools in return. Id. at
85. The trial judge ruled that the tools, valued at $5,000 and which the father
used in his trade as a skilled laborer, were a proper offset against the child
support obligation the mother would otherwise owe of fifty dollars per month.
Id. Three years later the father applied for welfare benefits and the state child
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In Vermont, the state legislature has seemingly answered the
question by statute, explaining that when child support has been
assigned to the State, the state actions are still controlled by the
best interests of the child standard and enforcement efforts should
not be taken if they would result in harm to the children. 133 The
clarity of the statute in protecting the best interests of children is
striking: ''When an assignment is in effect,. the state shall be guided
by the best interests of the child for whose benefit the action is
taken," and "[i]f, after reasonable inquiry into the circumstances of
the family, it is determined by the office of child support that an
action would not be in the best interests of the affected child, a
support action should not be undertaken.,,134
However, a 2002 decision by the Vermont Supreme Court leaves
the clarity and effect of the statute in question. In Powers v. Office
of Child Support, the court affirmed the dismissal of a custodial
parent's claims against the state child support agency (Office of
Child Support, or "OCS") for the failure to properly carry out its
statutory child support enforcement obligations. 135 Despite the
legislative requirement to protect the best interests of children, the
court concluded that "Vermont's statutory scheme was not intended
to benefit individual children and custodial parents, but was
intended to benefit Vermont society as a whole.,,136 The court
recognized that the child support agency is statutorily required to
"be guided by the best interests of the child," that the best interests
of the child are paramount, and even that "[t]he purpose of OCS
does not change depending upon whether or not the petitioner is
receiving public assistance or whether the petitioner has assigned
his or her rights to the agency.,,137 Despite this recognition, the court
support office became involved. The agency filed motions to increase the
mother's child support obligation and to receive reimbursement of the past and
continuing public assistance provided to the father. Id. The trial court granted
the motion to increase the ongoing monthly child support order but denied the
motion for past reimbursement, reasoning that the mother was entitled to the
agreed-upon $5,000 offset against her past child support obligation. Upholding
the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court of Alaska explained that
"situations may exist in which CSED's direct and derivative rights to
recoupment of public assistance payments should yield to equitable
considerations" and that "one such circumstance would be a child support offset
agreement that a court approved as serving a child's best interests." Id. at 86.
By allowing the father to keep his tools, the father was better able to maintain
his ability to provide for his son.
133. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4106(D (2001).
134. Id. § 4106(f).
135. 795 A.2d 1259, 1261 (Vt. 2002).
136. Id. at 1265.
137. Id. (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4106(f) (2001)).
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concluded that the language does not create individual rights or any
corresponding duty of OCS. 138 The court's language clouds the
seeming clarity of the statutory language, which places the best
interests of the children above all else, by describing the State's
fiscal interests and the interests of children as blended or on an
equal footing: "In neither case [whether child support is assigned to
the State or owed to the family] does the service provided by OCS
flow to an individual, but instead it flows to the welfare of the state,
its children, and its fisc.,,139
The Powers case harkens back to the mixed messages in the
1855 case of Perkins v. Mobley, discussed in Part I. 140 Over 150
years later, the Powers decision leaves a similar legacy of legal
uncertainty. When the State's fiscal interests come head-to-head
with the interests of children in Vermont, it is unclear after Powers
whether the state's courts will honor-and enforce-the statutory
priority of the best interests of children.
2.

Harvey v. Marshall

Not long after the Powers and Pealatere decisions avoided a
clear resolution of the conflict between state and child, a single
father struggling to raise his children presented an opportunity to
the Maryland courts. But as this Section describes, clarity was
. e IUSlve.
. 141
agam
142
Derek Harvey had four children by two different mothers.
The children were initially in the mothers' custody and both mothers
received welfare assistance, resulting in child support obligations
143
against Mr. Harvey that were assigned to the State.
Then, Mr.
Harvey took custody of all four children in 1996 when one of the
mothers died and the other mother abandoned the children. 144
During this time, Mr. Harvey also began to care for a fifth child, the
145
half sister to one of Mr. Harvey's daughters.
He raised all five
children, as a single parent, on less than eleven dollars per hour
working as a landscaper for the City of Baltimore. 146
138. Id. at 1265-66.
139. Id. at 1265.
140. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
141. Harvey v. Marshall, 884 A.2d 1171 (Md. 2005). The author of this
Article was co-counsel for the appellant, Derek T. Harvey.
142. Id. at 1174-75.
143. Id. at 1175.
144. Id. at 1174-75.
145. Id. at 1175.
146. Id. at 1177. He eventually married in 2002, and his new wife joined his
family along with a child of her own. Harvey v. Marshall, 857 A.2d 529, 533
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), affd, 884 A.2d 1171 (Md. 2005).

1058

WAKE FOREST LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42

Mter Mr. Harvey had already taken custody of all his children,
the Baltimore City Office of Child Support Enforcement, operated at
the time by MAXIMUS, Inc., started its efforts to collect the past
owed payments-asserting that Mr. Harvey owed approximately
147
thirty-two thousand dollars in arrearages.
Mter successfully
obtaining a custody order that was made effective from the date he
took custody in 1996, Mr. Harvey's arrearages were reduced. 148
Nevertheless, MAXIMUS continued to pursue approximately ten
thousand dollars in back payments that accrued prior to the change
in custody, all of which were owed to the State. 149
Mr. Harvey argued that the enforcement efforts to collect the
arrearages harmed the very children on whose behalf the support
orders were entered. The continued child support enforcement of
state-owed arrearages damaged his credit rating, prevented his
efforts to finance and purchase a family home, and reduced his
ability to save for his children's hopes of attending college. 15o When
the local child support office operated by MAXIMUS refused to stop
enforcement of the past arrearages, Mr. Harvey turned to the state
Child Support Enforcement Administration ("CSEA"). Mr. Harvey
asked the agency to exercise its statutory discretion to abate the
state-owed child support arrearages. 15I Initially, CSEA agreed. The
executive director of the agency issued a memorandum to the project
director of MAXIMUS indicating that it was in the children's best
interests to halt all enforcement efforts against Mr. Harvey, other
152
than collecting one dollar per year.
But MAXIMUS refused. The
company expressed concern that taking such action would harm its
collection rates and the company's financial interests and that the
company's computer system was not programmed appropriately to
allow compliance with the state agency directive. 153
With no further response from CSEA or MAXIMUS, Mr. Harvey
Harvey, 884 A.2d at 1175-76.
Id. at 1176.
Id. at 1176-77 & nA.
Id. at 1177.
Id. at 1176.
Id.
Id. at 1177. At trial, a MAXIMUS employee testified:
We didn't agree with this proposal because: (1) our computer
systems are not set up to read anything like this, which means
that if you have $5,000.00 on the system, we don't really have
much of a way to monitor these cases to make sure his taxes
are intercepted or not you know turned into the credit agency.
We have a lot of automated systems that are in place.
Id. The employee also explained that MAXIMUS did not like the proposal
because it "would potentially harm the numbers that show the local
enforcement office's collection rate." Id.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
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filed a motion seeking the set-aside of his child support orders. 154 He
argued that the court had statutory discretion to set aside child
support orders when in the best interests of the children. 155 Also, he
asserted that the failure of CSEA to exercise its statutory discretion
to abate the State-owed arrearages was arbitrary, capricious, and
illegal because the agency failed to consider the best interests of his
children and submitted to the private interests of MAXIMUS. 156 The
trial court denied Mr. Harvey's motion, the decision was upheld on
appeal by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals,157 and then the
decision was affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals. 15s
As Mr. Harvey's case percolated up through the Maryland
courts, arguments circled around the overarching question: what is
the primary purpose of child support? Despite the proclaimed
mission shift of child support enforcement from welfare cost
recovery to supporting children, Maryland's CSEA looked to the
past. Citing to the Maryland Bastardy Act, the agency contended
that the prime object of Maryland's child support and paternity
statutes is to protect the public from the burden of supporting
illegitimate children and to increase state revenues through welfare
cost recovery. 159 Mr. Harvey, pointing out that the Maryland
Bastardy Act was repealed long ago, contended that the primary
purpose of child support and paternity proceedings are now to
promote the best interests of children. 160
The dispute brings to light the clash of goals that has existed
since child support's beginnings but has essentially been ignored
ever since. The desire to reduce the public's responsibility of
supporting children and to recover welfare costs through assigned
child support have long been significant goals of the child support
program. 16l Likewise, since child support's beginnings, courts and
state statutes have espoused the primacy of the best interests of
154. Id.
155. Despite explicit statutory language allowing court discretion to set
aside child support orders when in the best interests of the children, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland concluded such action was barred by another statute
prohibiting retroactive modifications of child support obligations. Id. at 1178,
1183.
156. Id. at 1208.
157. Harvey v. Marshall, 857 A.2d 529, 532 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), affd,
884 A.2d 1171 (Md. 2005).
158. Harvey, 884 A.2d at 1214.
159. Brief of Appellee at 26, Harvey, 884 A.2d 1171 (Md. 2005) (No. 109);
Brief of Appellee at 22-23, Harvey v. Marshall, 857 A.2d 529 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2004) (No. 532).
160. Brief of Appellant at 12-13, Harvey, 884 A.2d 1171 (Md. 2005) (No.
109).
161. See supra notes 25, 36 and accompanying text.
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162
children in all child support proceedings.
The arguments-and current state of the law-quickly appear
circular. The assignment of child support and resulting state fiscal
interests in the support payments are statutorily created. 163
Therefore, pursing the State's fiscal interests is, at least by statute,
an appropriate goal. But pursuing the State's fiscal interests by
taking child support payments away from children and their
families is in direct conflict with the best interests of the childrenthe controlling legal standard applied to child support proceedings.
One could assume, and in doing so explain away the seemingly
unresolveable conflict, that the best interests standard only applies
where the support is owed to the children rather than to the State.
However, the primacy of the best interest of the child standard has
never been unlinked from assigned child support, and courts
continue to assert the standard as present regardless of the assigned
or nonassigned status of the child support. 164
Another possible answer could be that the fiscal interests of the
State can be pursued only if not to the detriment of the best
interests of the child. Both interests could be considered legitimate,
but ranked. In fact, the Maryland Department of Human Resources
explains such a ranking in its advertised mission and purposes for
child support enforcement. The agency first explains the dual
purposes of child support: "Child Support exists 1) to raise the
standard of living for children by enforcing their right to support
from both of their parents and 2) to reduce or recover welfare
costS.,,165 Then, apparently recognizing the conflict, the agency
clarifies: "Child Support Enforcement operates with these guiding
principles: The best interest of the child is our highest priority.,,166
However, when the conflict was presented in the courts, the agency
argued the reverse, contending that the welfare cost recovery goals
have always been and continue to be the paramount concern of child
support enIiorcement. 167
And were a state child support agency true to such a statement
of a ranking and priority of the best interests of the child, a practical
problem exists. There is never a time when the State's fiscal
interests in welfare cost recovery are not in direct conflict with the

162. See supra notes 52, 130.
163. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 52, 130 and accompanying text.
165. Maryland Department of Human Resources, Maryland Child Support
Enforcement Program: The Mission of Child Support Enforcement,
http://www.dhr.state.md.us/csealmission.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
166. Id.
167. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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best interests of a child. The child's best interests will simply never
be served by enforcing an obligation that results in child support
being retained by the State rather than distributed to the child's
family. Thus, any attempted ranking of the competing purposes
results in a legal fiction.
The two interests simply cannot
. Iy COeXIS
. twa
.
h armomous
In Harvey v. Marshall, the Maryland Court of Appeals
ultimately resolved the dispute in favor of the State's fiscal interests
and even found it appropriate to prioritize the private interests of
169
MAXIMUS over the interests of the children.
Mr. Harvey had
requested the state child support agency to exercise its discretion,
provided by statute, to abate the State-owed child support
170
arrearages.
At the time of the decision, the relevant statute,
section 10-112 of Maryland's Family Law Code, explained that the
discretion to abate arrearages should be guided by the best interests
of the State. l7l However, because another statute in the same
subtitle, section 10-118, mandated that the child support agency
"promote and serve the best interests of the child in carrying out
their child support responsibilities under this subtitle," Mr. Harvey
argued that the best interests of the State should be interpreted as
aligned with the best interests of the children. In In other words, the
best interests of the State must be to. promote and serve the best
interests of the state's children.
The Maryland Court of Appeals disagreed. Although the
statute requiring the state agency to promote and serve the
children's best interests explicitly applied to all child support
responsibilities codified under the same subtitle and the statute
providing discretion to abate state-owed arrearages was within that
same subtitle, the court nonetheless refused to apply the best
interests of the child mandate. Through its interpretation of
statutory construction, the court refused to harmonize the multiple
provisions within the same statutory scheme:

168. This problem is therefore also present in the Vermont statute discussed
in Powers v. Office of Child Support. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying
text.
169. The state child support agency had initially indicated agreement with
Mr. Harvey's request and asked MAXlMUS, the private contractor operating
the local child support office, to halt enforcement efforts against Mr. Harvey.
Harvey v. Marshall, 884 A.2d 1171, 1176 (Md. 2005).
However, when
MAXIMUS refused due to concerns with its collection rate and computer
system, the state agency deferred to the private interests. [d. at 1177.
170. Id. at 1178.
171. Id. at 1194-95.
172. Id. at 1195.
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We conclude instead that the language of § 10-112 indicates
that the Legislature intended a different standard, other
than the "best interests of the child" standard, to govern the
settlement of arrearages. Even though it may be a "child
support responsibilit[y]," the Legislature made a conscious
election that the forgiveness of arrear ages was an action,
separate and distinct from other "child support
responsibilities," that, because of its unique purpose,
warranted a different standard.
Although the "best
interests of the child" standard is generally the standard
that applies in paternity or other family law matters
relating to child support, there are some situations in which
the Legislature has mandated, and the courts apply, a
different standard or have limited, or in some way
precluded, the application of the "best interests of the child"
standard. 173
As for the concern Mr. Harvey raised regarding the State's
deferral to MAXIMUS's private fiscal interests in enhancing its
collection rates-and thereby receiving more money through the
incentive structure established with the State-the Court of Appeals
found such deference to a private company's desire for profits to be
. t e. 174
appropna
Thus, regarding the conflict between the State's fiscal interests
and the best interests of the children, the Maryland Court of
Appeals leaves us with this: "the 'best interests of the child'
standard is generally the standard that applies" but "there are some
situations in which the Legislature has mandated" that a different
standard applies or the best interest of child standard applies but is
simply more limited. 175
According to the court, even the
173. Id. at 1199-1200 (alteration in original).
174. Id. at 1213-14. This decision affirmed the conclusion of the Court of
Special Appeals, which explained more directly that such deference to private
fiscal interests can be appropriate even when detrimental to the best interests
of the child. See Harvey v. Marshall, 857 A.2d 529, 547 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2004) ("We are persuaded that this motivation is a legitimate one in this
context, because financial incentives for performance and achievement are an
integral part of private enterprise. The legislature ... undoubtedly understood
that when a private company undertakes to collect monies owed to the State, its
success in doing so may benefit both the company and the State. Although this
financial incentive may work to the detriment of a debtor like Harvey, as well
as his children, it also may work to the benefit of the State's citizens as a whole.
The financial health of the State affects almost every citizen, including children,
whether he or she benefits from an increase in services offered, a decrease in
taxes paid, or both.").
175. Harvey, 884 A.2d at 1199.
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prioritization of the interests of private industry over the interests
of children is fine if in the pursuit of the State's fiscal interests. 176
But even with such blows to the best interests of the child standard,
the court could not bring itself to resolve and clarify the conflict once
and for all by explaining that the best interests of the child standard
is simply irrelevant where the State's fiscal interests are statutorily
indicated. Rather, in a footnote, the court returned to the legal
uncertainty in which the case began: "This is not to say that the
CSEA may not factor into its calculus the 'best interests of the child'
when exercising its discretion whether to forgive child support
arrearages. We hold, rather, that that standard is neither the sole
nor paramount one controlling such decisions.,,177
B.

Is Assigned Child Support Still Child Support?
If no legally sound resolution to the conflict between the
competing purposes is available, the only logical alternative may
simply be to redefine assigned child support so that the conflict no
longer exists. If assigned child support is no longer child support,
but merely a state debt, the children's interests become irrelevant.
In fact, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals took this route in the
first level of appeal in Harvey. Mr. Harvey argued that the child
support agency must be guided by the best interests of the child in
deciding whether to exercise the statutory discretion to abate stateowed arrearages, relying on the statute requiring that "the
Administration and local support enforcement offices shall promote
and serve the best interests of the child in carrying out their child
support responsibilities under this subtitle.,,178 The Court of Special
Appeals disagreed, noting that the agency is "collecting money that
will be returned to the state coffers" rather than "collecting support
from one parent that will go to the other parent to benefit a child.,,179
Thus, the court concluded the best interests of the child standard
does not apply in considering whether to abate assigned support
arrearages because "the Administration and local support
enforcement offices are not 'carrying out a child support
responsibilit[y] under [the] subtitle.",180

176. [d. at 1201-02.
177. [d. at 1202 n.30. After the decision in Harvey, legislation was
introduced in the Maryland General Assembly to clarify that the best interests
of the child standard should apply to the agency discretion. MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAw § 10-112 (LexisNexis 2006); see H.B. 453, 2006 Gen. Assemb., 421st
Sess. (Md. 2006). The legislation was passed and signed into law.
178. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 10-118.
179. Harvey v. Marshall, 857 A.2d 529, 542 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004).
180. [d. (alterations in original).
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Under this reasoning, and as the child support agency argued in
Harvey, the debt is no different from taxes or a debt owed to Sears
for a refrigerator. lSI In other words, children would be better off if
their parents could be relieved of all their tax debts, credit card
debts, and home loans but such is not the reality oflife or law. This
reasoning makes some sense. Child support, after it is assigned to
the State, exists for the benefit of reimbursing state costs and has
nothing to do with helping children. Thus, the argument goes,
assigned child support should no longer possess the special status
linked to the best interests of the children.
For that logic to work, the transition must be legally possible.
Child support is assigned to the State under the welfare cost
recovery rules when a custodial parent applies for TANF welfare
ls2
The assignment occurs as part of the process of
assistance.
applying for benefits, generally through some sort of signed
agreement or (hopefully) an informed understanding of the result of
applying for benefits. ls3
The law has long recognized an assignment of rights as a valid
form of contract with three parties: an assignor, assignee, and
ls4
obligor.
In TANF cases, the custodial parent is generally the
assignor of child support rights, the State is the assignee, and the
absent parent is the obligor. ls5 Within this context, for the
assumption to hold that assigned child support is transformed into
state debt and unlinked from the best interests of the child
standard, the assignment must change the nature of the legal rights
assigned. However, a basic principle of assignment law is that the
assignee's rights cannot be greater or materially different than those
ls6
of the assignor.
If an assignee's rights cannot be greater or
different than those of the assignor, and the assignor's rights in
child support are constrained by the child's best interests, then such
constraint must follow with any assignment to the State. If not,
then something other than a valid assignment is occurring.

181. Brief of Appellee at 21-22, Harvey v. Marshall, 857 A.2d 529 (No. 532).
182. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 608(a)(2)-{3), 654(29) (2000).
183. In contrast, child support is generally assigned to the state in foster
care cases simply by statute rather than through any voluntary or informed
process. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(17).
184. See Bryan D. Hull, Harmonization of Rules Governing Assignments of
Right to Payment, 54 SMU L. REV. 473, 478-81 (2001) (discussing the history
and law governing assignments).
185. Paula Roberts, In the Frying Pan and in the Fire: AFDC Custodial
Parents and the JV-D System, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1407, 1407-08 (1985).
186. Hull, supra note 184, at 480 (explaining that the "Restatement provides
that contract rights can be assigned unless the assignment would ... materially
change the duty or materially increase the burden or risk of the obligor").
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Further, even if the underlying assignment is valid and can
transform child support into mere state debt, additional side effects
may result. For example, many of the specialized child support
enforcement tools may no longer be available for a mere state debt.
Federal law allows garnishments to enforce child support
obligations up to sixty-five percent of wages,187 but garnishments of
wages to enforce mere state debts may be limited to the much lower
caps for general debt obligations. 188
Similarly, whereas state
constitutions generally prohibit incarceration for a debt, an
189
exception has been applied to child support.
Such exceptions may
no longer be available if assigned child support is no longer child
support, and contempt proceedings across the country would need to
be altered or disbanded in assigned child support cases so that
incarceration would no longer be an available sanction. 190
The Maryland Court of Appeals agreed with Mr. Harvey's
arguments that if assigned child support is transformed into a mere
state debt, then several of the specialized child support enforcement
tools would no longer be available. The court therefore overturned
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals' conclusion that assigned
child support is no longer really child support. 191 However, while the
Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that assigned child support is
indeed still child support, the court nonetheless viewed and treated
assigned support differently-not as a mere state debt, not as
regular child support owed to children, but apparently as something
192
different altogether.
The Harvey decision illustrates that as long

187. 15 U.s.C. § 1673(b)(2) (2000).
188. See Richard M. Hynes, Bankruptcy and State Collections: The Case of
the Missing Garnishments, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 625 (2006) (explaining that
"[f]ederallaw enacted in 1968 limits wage garnishment by general creditors to
the lesser of twenty-five percent of the debtor's take-home payor the amount by
which the debtor's take-home pay exceeds thirty times the federal minimum
wage" and that "[mlany states restrict wage garnishment further, and at least
four states prohibit wage garnishment altogether").
189. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CaNST. art. III, § 38 (West 2006) ("[Slupport of
a spouse or dependent children, or for the support of an illegitimate child or
children, or for alimony ... shall not constitute a debt within the meaning of
this section.").
190. Further, federal and state laws prohibit retroactive modifications of
child support orders. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9)(C) (2000); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAw § 12-104 (West 2006). Such laws should no longer apply to a mere state
debt. Even the usage of child support guidelines, which each state is required
under federal law to establish to guide the determination of initial child support
orders, would no longer seem applicable for the establishment of debts that are
not considered child support.
191. Harvey v. Marshall, 884 A.2d 1171, 1195-96 (Md. 2005).
192. The court explained that the agency's decision whether to eliminate
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as welfare cost recovery efforts continue, so will the resulting legal
morass. And the conflicts and resulting legal confusion do not exist
solely in the realm of academics, but also in the reality facing
welfare families and society.
III. IMPACT OF WELFARE COST RECOVERY

Child support can provide much needed assistance when the
payments are distributed to children and their families, and in
millions of cases the child support program is now making
tremendous strides toward doing just that. Although the primary
purpose of creating the IV-D child support program was to collect
government-owed child support in order to reimburse welfare costs,
child support enforcement services have also been made available to
individuals not receiving welfare benefits. 193 These CSE non-TANF
collections are not used to reimburse government welfare costs but
rather are provided directly to the individuals receiving child
support enforcement services. Enforcement trends show that nonTANF collections have grown much faster than collections for the
purpose of reimbursing welfare costs. From 2002 to 2006, total
distributed CSE TANF collections decreased from $2.9 to $2.1
billion, whereas total distributed CSE non-TANF collections
increased from $17.2 to $21.8 billion. 194 Thus, CSE non-TANF
collections now account for over ninety-one percent of all child
support collections.
While not the initial aim of the IV-D program, the impressive
increase in child support collections for CSE non-TANF families
provides a significant benefit to the families and to society. But the
other side of child support enforcement-that which continues in the
realm of welfare cost recovery efforts-is a different story.
A.

Family Economics
They don't want to cooperate, because it will only hurt their
family. They don't want to have the State collect

arrearages "may at times be incongruent with the 'best interests of the child,'
particularly when the State, in lieu of the delinquent, responsible parent's
payment of support, has advanced public funds to support the child." [d. at
1200. Also, the court noted "there is a remarkable distinction between the
judicial determination of child support, which certainly implicates the best
interests of a child, and the forgiveness of arrearages that accrued through no
fault of the child and are often due to a noncustodial parent's financial problems
or irresponsibility." [d.
193. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
194. 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at fig.7.
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their children's support, because it will hurt their children.
- Child Support Caseworker l95
Although families applying for TANF assistance must give up
their rights to child support, proponents of welfare cost recovery
contend that potential financial benefit to the families is present in
the trade-off. In order to receive welfare assistance during a time of
need, custodial parents must cooperate in establishing support
obligations against the absent parents and then trade away their
196
children's rights to receive the resulting child support payments.
Arguably, the forced exchange might be considered a better
than equal trade. The amount of child support assigned cannot
exceed the amount of the welfare grant, so the transaction is equal
because a dollar of welfare assistance is received in exchange for a
197
dollar of child support assigned.
Also, an added benefit of
receiving welfare assistance rather than child support is the
regularity of payments. Welfare payments generally arrive in the
same dollar amount at the same time every month. In contrast,
child support payments for low-income families are irregular at
best. 19s Because the noncustodial parents are often also poor, the
families may go months without seeing a payment only to then
receive sporadic and partial amounts. In addition to the regularity
of payments, another benefit to families receiving TANF assistance
is an increased likelihood of receiving Medicaid, child care, and a
variety of other support services. Then, when the families are ready
to leave TANF, they will leave with child support obligations intact,
continued child support enforcement services, and the future
199
support payments owed to the families.
The benefits of the forced tradeoff are readily apparent, and
low-income parents regularly make the decision to apply for TANF

195.
196.
197.
198.

CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES, supra note 77, at 7.
See supra notes 61-63,73-74 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3) (2000).
See MARIA CANCIAN & DANIEL R. MEYER, INST. FOR RESEARCH ON
POVERTY, CHILD SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN UNCERTAIN AND IRREGULAR
INCOME SOURCE? 16 (2005), available at http://www.irp.wisc.edulpublications/
dps/pdfs/dpl29805.pdf (concluding that "the contribution of child support to
many families' economic well-being is reduced because of the instability of that
support" and that this instability is greatest for low-income families).
199. Although payments on current child support obligations are distributed
to the families after they leave welfare, significant percentages of the child
support arrearages are often still owed to the government. When payments are
made on the arrearages, the amounts are divided between the arrearages owed
to the families and the government pursuant to complex distribution rules. See
42 U.S.C. § 657 (2000).
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assistance precisely because ofthe benefits. However, stepping back
to consider the broader view of the economic realities for families
receiving TANF, the value of the tradeoff becomes much less clear.
First, the loss of assigned child support payments comes at a
time when the families most need the additional financial support.
A primary goal of the TANF program is to move recipients into the
workplace and increase their chances of long-term economic self2oo
reliance.
If families receiving welfare assistance were also able to
receive child support payments, their chances for making ends meet
and working towards economic stability would be greatly improved.
Studies show that TANF families are the most economically fragile
at the time of leaving welfare for work and that extra assistance
from child support or other sources would significantly help prepare
for the transition. For example, a 2005 study funded by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services explains that "[c]hild
support can represent an important income source for many lowincome families, and the receipt of support may be most critical for
women as they transition off welfare.,,201 Wisconsin received a
federal waiver of the welfare cost recovery rules in 1997, allowing
the State to pass through all child support payments directly to the
families while simultaneously disregarding the income from
counting toward welfare eligibility.202 Studies examining the waiver
program have indicated significant success, including "increased
paternity establishment, increased child support collections, and
little additional governmental cost.,,203

200. See id. § 601(a)(2) (stating that one of the primary TANF purposes is to
"end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job
preparation, work, and marriage").
201. CYNTHIA MILLER ET AL., THE INTERACTION OF CHILD SUPPORT AND TANF:
EVIDENCE FROM SAMPLES OF CURRENT AND FORMER WELFARE RECIPIENTS, at ES-1
(2005), available at http://www.mdrc.org/publicationsJ397/full.pdf; see also
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
DISTRIBUTING COLLECTED CHILD SUPPORT To FAMILIES EXITING TANF, at i
(2001), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oeilreportsJoei-05-01-00220.pdf ("Families
may be most vulnerable during the months before and immediately following
the end of their receipt of TANF assistance. Payment of child support at this
juncture is likely to have a great impact on the success of the transition from
TANF to self-sufficiency.").
202. See generally DANIEL R. MEYER ET AL., W-2 CHILD SUPPORT
DEMONSTRATION EVALUATION PHAsE 2: FINAL REPORT (2003), available at
http://www.irp.wisc.edu/research/childsup/csde/publications/phase2/phase2final.pdf(describing the results of Wisconsin's full pass-through experiment).
203. See MARCIA CANCIAN ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF CHILD SUPPORT PASSTHROUGH
AND
DISREGARD
POLICIES
4
(2006),
available
at
http://www.irp.wisc.edu/research/childsup/csdeipublicationsJcancian-meyer-roffd.pdf.
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In addition to the negative impact on families' economic
stability by giving up child support payments to the government,
families may also unwittingly give up other informal and in-kind
support as a result of cooperating with child support enforcement.
In 2000, the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of
Inspector General ("OIG") completed a report regarding problems
and needed improvements in the IV-D program's practices in
enforcing the child support cooperation requirements. 204
An
important finding of the report explains that "child support
enforcement may actually make some TANF families worse off.,,205
The main harm to families addressed by the OIG report is financial:
some noncustodial parents may stop providing informal or in-kind
support to custodial parents who cooperate in establishing and
206
enforcing child support obligations.
To reduce the harm, the
report recommends that states should take advantage of the broad
flexibility provided through welfare reform and reconsider their
current child support policies to ensure they are not "counterproductive to long-term goals of helping clients attain independence
and self-sufficiency.,,207
Moreover, an examination of the available child support data
exposes a possible trend that raises questions regarding the benefit
perceived by families of leaving TANF with child support obligations
intact. From 2001 to 2005, the total child support caseload declined
from 17.1 million to 15.9 million. 208 All of the reduction came from
209
the caseload of current and former TANF recipients.
The decline
in current TANF recipients in the child support caseload is not
surprising because states continue to tighten their enforcement of
the TANF eligibility requirements and recipients have begun to
204. CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES, supra note 77.
205. Id. at 16.
206. Id. at 7 ("Even if no child support is collected, as staff report is often the
case, the noncustodial parent may withhold informal or in-kind support if the
client cooperates with authorities."); see also Karen Syma Czapanskiy, To
Protect and Defend: Assigning Parental Rights When Parents Are Living in
Poverty, 14 WM. & MARy BILL RTS. J. 943, 957 (2006) ("It also seems likely that
informal economic and social support offered by many low-income fathers and
their families is more important to their children than the small amounts of
child support the fathers can pay, especially when the child support often goes
to reimbursing the state for public benefits rather than to the child's
household. "); Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining Child
Support for Poor Fathers, 39 V.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 1004-08 (2006) (discussing
the benefits of informal and in-kind support provided by low-income, MricanAmerican fathers).
207. CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES, supra note 77, at 16.
208. 2005 REPORT, supra note 5, at fig. I.
209. Id.
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reach the five-year time limit on benefits. 210 However, the decline in
former TANF assistance families in the child support caseload
seems to conflict with the claims that TANF families will view the
forced welfare cost recovery system as a benefit because they will be
able to leave TANF with child support and child support
enforcement services intact. If all former TANF families perceived
the child support obligations and enforcement services as a benefit,
a decrease in current TANF cases in the child support caseload,
resulting from families leaving welfare, would seemingly result in a
corresponding increase in former TANF families in the caseload.
But according to the data, once families stop receiving TANF and
are no longer obligated to cooperate with child support enforcement,
the possibility is present that many of the families may be choosing
to forgo ongoing child support services.

B.

Public Economics
At first glance, the cost effectiveness of the welfare cost recovery
effort via the IV-D child support program appears to be excellent
and improving every year. In 2006, total IV-D child support
collections reached almost $24 billion, an increase of over $8 billion
in total collections since 1999. 211 With total federal and state
administrative costs at approximately $5.6 billion in 2006, every
combined federal and state dollar invested in administering the
program resulted in over four dollars in child support collections. 212
However, what initially appears to be purely a success-a program
that provides more than a four hundred percent return on
investment-is in reality a divided story.
1. Government Finances
Of the almost $24 billion in child support collected at a
combined federal and state administrative cost of $5.6 billion in
2006, less than $2 billion went towards reimbursing the federal and
state costs of providing welfare assistance. 213 Thus, every $5.6 of
210. See generally U.s. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 96 (discussing
effects of the declining TANF caseloads and corresponding decline in child
support welfare cases).
211. 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at tbl.l; OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ANNUAL STATISTICAL
REPORT FOR FISCAL YEARS 1999 AND 2000 tbl.1, available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubsl2002/reportsldatareportltable_l.html
(last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
212. 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at tbl.1.
213. [d. Total assistance reimbursement in 2006 was $1,961,471,945. [d. at
tbl.l, n.2 ("Total assistance reimbursement equals collections that will be
divided between the State and Federal governments to reimburse their
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administrative costs for the child support program results in less
than $2 of cost reimbursement.
The big payoff from the
administrative cost investment is the almost $22 billion in support
214
payments that are directed to children and their families.
But
welfare cost recovery results in minimal benefit to the government's
net finances and possibly even a loss.
Historically, the welfare recoupment efforts of the child support
program resulted in a profit for state governments while the federal
government operated at a loss.215 Total state savings or profits were
initially greater than the federal cost, which resulted in a net
216
savings for taxpayers.
As the program grew, the public savings
declined. The net savings went negative for the first time in 1989,
and since that time, net losses have increased almost every year to
217
the 2006 net loss of $3.6 billion.
However, even when the
combined federal and state program began operating at a net loss in
1989, most states were still making money on the program. 218 Then,
in 2000, states also began to experience aggregate losses each
year.219 In 2004, only ten states were still making a profit on the
child support program and states in the aggregate lost over $515
220
million.

respective shares of either Title IV-A (TANF) payments or Title IV-E (Foster
Care) maintenance payments.").
214. Id. at tbl.1 (reciting that total collections distributed to children and
families include approximately $139 million for current assistance cases, $8
billion for former assistance cases, $10.9 billion for never assistance cases, and
also $2.7 billion for families on Medicaid who never received TANF).
215. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 61, at 8-65. Deborah Harris recognized
the early financial deficits of the "welfare child support system" twenty years
ago. Harris, supra note 18, at 635-39 (explaining that as of 1987, the federal
government was losing money on the child support system, while states were
making money); see also Chambers, supra note 6, at 2592 ("[AJfter twenty years
of effort, the federal government collects much more than it once did in these
cases, but still expends hundreds of millions more than it nets in return for the
federal treasury.") (footnote omitted).
216. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 61, at 8-65 (noting that net savings was
$201 million in 1979, the first year such data was available).
217. 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at tb1.1 (listing values for total assistance
reimbursement and total administrative expenditures, which when subtracted,
indicate a net loss of approximately $3.6 billion); GREEN BOOK, supra note 61, at
8-66.
218. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 61, at 8-66.
219. Id. at 8-65 to 8-66.
220. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., FY 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS tb1.39 (2007),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubS/2007/reports/annualJeportl#40. The
numbers for 2004 continue the decline from only twelve states making a profit
in 2003 and an aggregate loss of over $461 million. Id.
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The government is now well aware that the IV-D program
operates at a loss, as is evident from analysis in the 2004 Green
Book prepared by the House of Representatives Committee on Ways
221
and Means.
However, the numbers do not tell the whole story.
The side of child support enforcement that provides support
payments to non-welfare families-but which does not result in
welfare cost recovery-has been enormously successful. The $5.6
billion administrative cost investment in the IV-D child support
program in 2006 resulted in almost $22 billion in child support
payments received from noncustodial parents going to directly
support families and children. 222 To put the social value of the
payments in perspective, the amount of child support collected and
provided to families in 2006 was $5.5 billion greater than the $16.5
billion in total federal spending on the nation's welfare program. 223
The support payments provided to families have a significant impact
on the families' economic stability and are especially helpful for lowincome families. 224 Also, when the support payments are provided to
families, an additional "cost avoidance" benefit occurs in addition to
the direct financial benefit to the families. 225 When families receive
the child support payments, they are less likely to need help from
welfare, food stamps, or other public assistance programs-resulting
in savings to the public finances. 226
Thus, whether the entire IV-D child support program costs
more to administer than the resulting amount of welfare cost

221. See GREEN BOOK, supra note 61, at 8-65 to 8-66.
222. 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at tbl.1.
223. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FY 2007 BUDGET IN
BRIEF:
ADMINISTRATION
FOR
CHILDREN
AND
FAMILIES
(2007),
http://www.hhs.gov/budgeU07budgeUacf.html (''TANF provides approximately
$16.5 billion annually to States, Territories, and eligible Tribes for the design of
creative programs to help families transition from welfare to self-sufficiency.").
224. See VICKI TuRETSKY, CTR. FOR LAw & SOC. POLICY, THE CHILD SUPPORT
PROGRAM: .AN INVESTMENT THAT WORKS 1 (2005), available at
www.clasp.org/publications/cs3unding_072605.pdf ("Next to the mothers'
earnings, child support is the second largest income source for poor families
receiving child support."); id. at 2 (noting that custodial parents receiving child
support are more likely to find and keep jobs).
225. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT COST AVOIDANCE IN 1999: FINAL REPORT (2003),
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubS/2003/reports/cost_avoidance.
226. [d. A study by the Urban Institute prepared for the Federal Office of
Child Support Enforcement concluded that the increased family self-sufficiency
resulting from child support payments provided to families resulted in $2.6
billion in avoided costs in public assistance programs in FY 1999, including
TANF, subsidized housing, Supplemental Security Income, food stamps, and
Medicaid. [d.

2007]

CHILD SUPPORT HARMING CHILDREN

1073

recovery is not the important question because that measure does
not take into account the successes and benefits of the child support
program in vastly increasing child support payments to families.
Rather, the important fiscal question, which is not considered in the
Green Book report prepared by Congress, is whether the part of the
IV-D child support program devoted solely to welfare cost recovery is
cost effective. More data and a comprehensive study are needed to
accurately answer the question, but the following preliminary
examination of the available data illustrates that a positive answer
may be in doubt.
The $5.6 billion in total IV-D program administrative costs are
227
not broken down by type of case. Therefore, to estimate the cost of
collecting the $2 billion in welfare cost recovery, one can begin by
simply assuming an equal administrative cost for enforcing each
child support case. Under this assumption, the administrative costs
of welfare cost recovery will be understated because it is well
understood that child support cases with assigned support are
228
generally more difficult and costly to enforce.
Setting that fact
aside, the average annual administrative cost per child support
case-calculated under the equal cost per case assumption-is
approximately $354. 229
Then, the analysis can continue by
examining the cost effectiveness of collection efforts in current
assistance cases where the bulk of collections are distributed to the
government. 230 In 2006, enforcement efforts in the 2.3 million
current assistance cases (families currently receiving welfare
assistance) resulted in approximately $985 million in collections or
about $428 per case with about $363 per case retained by the
227. See 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at tbl.l.
228. See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.s. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON WAYS
AND MEANS AND THE SENATE COMMITTEE OF FINANCE: CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT
INCENTIVE
FUNDING
(1997),
available
at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/rpt/secyrpt.htm
(explaining
that
"collection in TANF and former TANF cases is generally more difficult than in
non-TANF cases").
229. Total administrative costs of about $5.6 billion divided by total IV-D
case load of about 15.8 million equals approximately $354 in administrative
costs per child support case. 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at fig. 1, tbl.l.
230. Of the $985 million in current assistance collections in 2006,
approximately $835 million, or eighty-five percent, was kept by the government
as assistance reimbursement. Id. at tbl.l. By comparison, of the approximately
$9.2 billion in total former assistance collections in 2006, approximately $8
billion was distributed directly to families rather than kept by the government.
Id. Because most of the collections in former TANF cases are distributed to the
families, it is more difficult to estimate the administrative cost of only those
collections retained by the government.
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government as welfare cost recovery.231 Thus, without correcting for
the understated assumption, the government spends only slightly
less on administrative costs per current assistance case than the
resulting collections retained by the government per case ($354 per
case in administrative costs compared with $363 per case in welfare
cost recovery collections). Even with very minor corrections for what
are likely the greater administrative costs of current assistance
cases, the resulting cost effectiveness of the welfare cost recovery
efforts is possibly at or below the break-even point. 232 Moreover,
these calculations do not take into account the lost "cost avoidance"
benefits that lead to a reduction in government costs because
families who receive child support payments are more likely to leave
public assistance sooner and less likely to need the assistance in the
future. 233 When families do not receive child support payments
under the welfare cost recovery program, any cost avoidance
benefits are lost.

2. Societal Costs
When families receive child support, the payments can help
reduce the number of children living in poverty. Thus, the reverse
must also be true: when child support payments are retained by the
government, fewer children are lifted above the poverty line. The
impact of child poverty is not felt by the families and children alone.
A recent study concludes that the cost to the United States resulting
from child poverty amounts to about five hundred billion dollars
annually, or almost four percent of the GDP.234
Also, as child support enforcement efforts have strengthened, an
231. Id. at tbls.1 & 2. First, divide the current assistance total, which was
approximately $985 million in 2006, by the total number of current assistance
cases, which was approximately 2.3 million in 2006, to calculate the distribution
of collections per assistance case-which was approximately $428 in 2006.
Then, divide the current assistance reimbursement, which was approximately
$835 million in 2006, by the total number of current assistance cases, which,
again, was approximately 2.3 million in 2006, to calculate the total number of
assistance the government actually retained-which was approximately $363
million in 2006. Id.
232. However, the additional $55 in collections per assistance case that are
routed to families or for medical support ($428 total collections per assistance
case minus the $363 per assistance case retained by the government) should not
be discounted. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 204-07, 226 and accompanying text.
234. Hearing on Economic and Societal Costs of Poverty Before the H. Comm.
on Ways and Means, 1l0th Congo (2007) (statement of Harry J.
Holzer, Professor, Georgetown University & Visiting Fellow at the
Urban Institute,
Georgetown University Public Policy Institute),
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=5398.
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increasing concern has emerged regarding the possible effect on
labor force participation among low-income noncustodial parents. In
a recent book by Peter Edelman, Harry Holzer, and Paul Offner, the
authors explain that child support enforcement disproportionately
impacts young African-American men and has a contributing
negative impact on their participation in the workforce. 235 Facing
child support orders set at unrealistically high amounts, quickly
accruing arrearages, and up to 65% of their wages being garnished
to pay the obligation, many obligors simply opt out of the "aboveground" economy.236 The negative impact on workforce participation
may be particularly strong for welfare fathers: "Furthermore, much
of [the] child support payments are not 'passed through' to families
by the states, further lessening incentives for low-income men to
work in the formal economy and meet these obligations.,,237 The
numbers are not insignificant. From 1989 to 1999, the percentage of
young African-American men in the workforce dropped from
approximately 60% to 50%.238 During the same time period-which
included the beginning of the TANF program with strengthened
child support enforcement efforts against absent parents and
stricter work requirements for custodial parents-the workforce
participation rate for young African-American women increased
from approximately 40% to 52%.239 The ripple effect when lowIncome noncustodial parents leave the formal economy is
immediate. The obligors are more likely to engage in criminal
activities, less likely to seek medical care without employersponsored health insurance, less likely to pay taxes, less likely to
pay child support, and less likely to have a positive relationship with
the custodial parents or their children.

235. PETER EDELMAN ET AL., RECONNECTING DISADVANTAGED YOUNG MEN 129
(2006) (emphasizing that "by age 34, up to one-half of black men are
noncustodial fathers"). The authors listed several other contributing factors to
the decline in workforce participation among young African-American men
including declining real wages, weak skills, discrimination, and criminal
histories. Id. at 19. For a recent study reaching a different conclusion-that
more strict child support enforcement does not cause noncustodial parents to
leave the above ground economy, see Lauren M. Rich, Irwin Garfinkel, & Qin
Gao, Child Support Enforcement Policy and Unmarried Fathers' Employment in
the Underground Regular Economies, 26 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 791 (2007).
236. Id. at 129-30; see also Hatcher & Lieberman, supra note 7, at 5;
Murphy, supra note 8, at 345.
237. EDELMAN ET AL., supra note 235, at 129-30.
238. Id. at 15 tbI.2.3.
239. [d.
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Noneconomic Impact: Theory v. Reality
In addition to the governmental goal of reimbursing welfare
costs and thereby reducing the burden on public finances,
proponents of welfare cost recovery also contend that the program
benefits families and society by increasing paternal responsibility,
improving family relationships, and decreasing the number of
children born out of wedlock. By forcing low-income mothers to
identify fathers and cooperate in enforcing assigned child support
obligations, the argument goes, more of the burden of supporting
children will be shifted from government programs to the absent
fathers and the fathers will be pulled back into the responsibilitybased social fabric. Also, through an increasingly effective child
support enforcement machine, the threat of child support may deter
unplanned out-of-wedlock births from occurring in the first place.
However, the possible deterrent effect is uncertain,240 and the forced
responsibility comes at the cost of conflict. Thus, the question
considered in this Section is whether the potential social benefits of
forcing paternal responsibility through the welfare cost recovery
system are worth the corresponding costs.
C.

Benefits of Forced Paternal Responsibility?
Although families and children generally receive no financial
benefit from welfare cost recovery, the policy has been promoted as
resulting in social benefits simply by increasing paternal
responsibility.241 Irwin Garfinkel argued that forcing low-income
fathers to take financial responsibility for their children will lead to
increased self-respect.
If a poor father "is excused from
contributing," Garfinkel explained, "he gets the message that he has
nothing of value to share with his child.,,242 But if the father is
forced to pay child support, "he gets the message that, no matter
how little he has, he still has something worthwhile to offer his
child.,,243 Similarly, Harry Krause describes a danger in what he
termed "subculture theories" that defend reduced responsibility for
the low-income, primarily African-American fathers of children born
1.

240. See Robert D. Plotnik et aI., The Impact of Child Support Enforcement
Policy on Nonmarital Childbearing, 26 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 79 (2006)
(concluding that strong child support enforcement may result in fewer
nonmarital births, but acknowledging several uncertainties and that more
study is needed).
241. Roger J.R. Levesque, Targeting "Deadbeat" Dads: The Problem With the
Direction of Welfare Reform, 15liAMLiNE J. PUB. L. & POL'y 1, 36-37 (1994).
242. Id. at 42 (quoting IRWIN GARFINKEL, AsSURING CHILD SUPPORT: AN
EXTENSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY 133 (1992)).
243. Id.
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out of wedlock:
In practice such theories help perpetuate the lack of selfsufficient family structures that has been the legacy of
economic deprivation. To the extent non-responsibility is
excused, even justified, rather than merely explained, these
theories help perpetuate a status quo in which the black
father is encouraged not to stand up for his child. 244
The reasoning is simple: if a low-income absent father no longer
lives in hiding but is forced to shoulder his familial responsibilities,
the father will view himself with increased value and with less
shame. The father should be able to engage in increased contact
with his children without embarrassment, and a snowball effect will
occur that continually encourages the father to improve his financial
situation.
Although there is little research to support this social value
theory of coerced paternal responsibility,245 the logic is intuitive.
However, the theory begins to break down once the reality of welfare
fathers is realized. Beginning with the nature of the obligation,
because the child support obligations of welfare fathers are
generally owed to the government rather than to the children, the
fathers are less likely to feel a parental responsibility, desire to pay,
or feel a sense of pride and family attachment when they do pay.
Moreover, like mothers applying for assistance, fathers of children
on welfare are often poor themselves. 246 Child support obligations
are frequently set at unrealistic levels and quickly become
unmanageable, resulting in thousands of dollars owed in
arrearages. 247
The total national child support debt reached

244. KRAUSE, supra note 14, at 294.
245. Levesque, supra note 241, at 37 (explaining that there is no empirical
support for the claims that tougher child support enforcement will lead to
increased parental responsibility or improved family ties); cf Chien-Chung
Huang, Child Support Enforcement and Father Involvement for Children in
Never-Married Mother Families, 4 FATHERING 97 (2006) (concluding that
stricter child support enforcement may lead to greater father involvement with
children, but recognizing that several variables raise doubts about the possible
connection).
246. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also EDELMAN ET AL., supra
note 235, at 27; VICKI TURETSKY, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, REALISTIC CHILD
SUPPORT POLICIES FOR Low 'INCOME FATHERS 8-9 (2000), available at
http://www.clasp.org/publications/realistic_child_support_policies.htm;
Karen
Syma Czapanskiy, ALI Child Support Principles: A Lesson in Public Policy and
Truth-Telling, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'y 259,264-65 (2001) (describing the
potential impact of unrealistic child support orders on low-income obligors);
Hatcher & Lieberman, supra note 7, at 10-11.
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248
approximately $105 billion in 2006.
Almost two-thirds of the
obligors responsible for the debt had incomes of less than ten
249
thousand dollars.
And almost seventy percent of the total
arrearages accumulated from cases of current and former welfare
families. 250 Because of the economic situation of welfare fathers,
child support officials recognize that the arrearages are often
uncollectible. 251 Yet the child support machine never slows. The
fathers are repeatedly hauled into packed and chaotic courtrooms
and berated by frustrated family court judges for their failingsoften with the mothers and children present. 252 Many feelings are
present during the child support docket, but self-respect and pride
are usually not among them.
And the flip-side of forced paternal responsibility in the welfare
cost recovery system is the corresponding paternalistic treatment of
low-income mothers. Child support is often heralded by progressive
advocates as a strong tool to enforce the rights of mothers and
children against absent fathers. But in the welfare cost recovery
side of child support, a mother's rights are diminished because her
ability to choose the best course for her family is taken away.253 An
underlying but unstated rationale behind the coercion is likely a
belief that poor mothers are not to be trusted with decisions
regarding their children and that they should be deterred from
having children in a world where they cannot afford to raise them.
Thirty-six years ago, Krause convincingly argued for the rights and
equal treatment of illegitimate children, but simultaneously

248. See 2006 REPORT, supra note 1, at tbl.5.
249. See STORY BEHIND THE NUMBERS, supra note 6, at 1.
250. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 90, at tbl.65 (stating total debt for FY
2003 was $95.8 billion, of which $12.8 billion came from current assistance
cases, $53.9 billion came from former assistance cases, and $29.1 billion came
from never assistance cases).
251. See, e.g., OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATE IV-D PROGRAM FLEXIBILITY WITH RESPECT TO
Low INCOME OBLIGORS (2000), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/
pollPIQ/2000/piq-00-03.htm (encouraging programs to forgive uncollectible
state-owed child support arrearages).
252. See Hatcher & Lieberman, supra note 7, at 7-8.
253. The number of custodial parents who, for various reasons, may desire
not to pursue child support is likely substantial. A study conducted in 1986
indicates that of eligible mothers without child support awards, thirty-eight
percent explained the reason they were without an award is that they did not
want one. ANDREA H. BELLER & JOHN W. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE
ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT 20 (1993); see also Chien-Chung Huang & Hillard
Pouncy, Why Doesn't She Have a Child Support Order?: Personal Choice or
Objective Constraint, 54 FAM. REL. 547 (2005) (investigating the reasons why
thirty-six percent of eligible mothers do not pursue child support orders).
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supported the forced welfare cost recovery system that would ensure
the continued unequal and paternalistic treatment of all mothers
254
and children on welfare.
In a very real sense, the long outdated
notions from the time of the bastardy acts-when women were
treated as criminals and forced into court to protect society from the
burden of their illegitimate children-are still very much alive
within the policies of welfare cost recovery.
And with the
paternalistic treatment, as the next Section of the Article explains,
conflict rather than strengthened family ties and increased paternal
responsibility often results.

2. Culture of Conflict: State vs. State vs. Mom vs. Dad vs.
Child
Another proposed social benefit of welfare cost recovery is a
strengthening of family relationships.255
During congressional
debate over the pending creation of the IV-D program, a 1975
Senate Finance Committee Report explained that "as an effective
support collection system is established fathers will be deterred
from deserting their families to welfare and children will be spared
the effects of family breakup.,,256 Again, the goal of strengthening
families through deterrence makes some sense. But in practice, the
opposite often occurs: increased turmoil between family members
and even conflict between the State's own competing interests.
Welfare cost recovery's culture of conflict begins as the State's
own interests are aligned against each other. The self-interests of
states in child support can be expressed in two categories: one
looking forward and one looking back. Looking forward, states have
an interest in supporting the future welfare and best interests of
children and an interest in reducing the likelihood that singleparent households will need future public assistance. Looking back,
once a family has received welfare assistance, states have a shortterm interest in seeking reimbursement of the public costs of the
welfare assistance already provided. The interests are in direct
conflict. For a family who is currently on welfare but seeking to
become self-sufficient, as the TANF program requires, child support
payments provided directly to the family will serve the State
interests in encouraging family economic stability and reducing the
likelihood that the family will need welfare assistance in the future.
However, every dollar of child support routed to serve this forward254. See generally HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY
(1971).
255. Levesque, supra note 241, at 36-37.
256. S. REP. No. 93-1356 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133, 8146;
see Harris, supra note 18, at 635 n.88.
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looking interest is a dollar taken away from the State's goal of
reimbursing past welfare costs. Often, the state interests collide
within a single case. For example, a custodial parent who has left
welfare may have past child support arrearages owed to the State to
reimburse the past assistance while the current on-going support
obligation is owed to the parent. The child support office will be
taking child support away from the family to pay the State-owed
arrearages while simultaneously trying to give child support to the
family through enforcement of the current support.
In addition to the internal state struggle, welfare cost recovery
pits family members against each other.257 Mothers in TANF cases
are forced to repeatedly sue fathers to establish and then enforce
child support orders, compounding the already enormous stresses on
their fragile relationships.258 In a narrative by Lisa Kelly describing
a couple's experience in paternity court, the impact of welfare cost
recovery on the relationship between young mothers and fathers is
259
compellingly portrayed.
After describing the chaotic scene of the
child support agency's lawyer yelling out the names of countless
fathers appearing for paternity determinations or threatened with
incarceration for contempt, a brief dialogue between mother and
father occurs.260 As the father pleads with the mother to drop the
case and promises to provide her with financial support in lieu of the
welfare benefit, the mother struggles with the decision. 261 She wants
the father to be part of her and her child's life, but she desperately
needs the guarantee of a regular welfare payment and the medical
assistance card that comes with it:
She looked at him there in his t-shirt and jeans, his old
raggedy shoes. She knew he wanted to do it, but he just
couldn't. She had to think ofKiji now, what Kiji really needed.
And the sad truth was James couldn't give it.

257. Few studies have begun to examine the impact of child support
enforcement, or more specifically welfare cost recovery, on the relationships
between family members. See Royce A. Hutson, Child Support and Parental
Conflict in Low-income Families, 29 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 1142 (2007)
(examining the possible impact of child support enforcement upon parental
contact and conflict and noting that little research has addressed the effect that
strict child support enforcement may have on parental relations).
258. Maldonado, supra note 206, at 1015 (explaining how child support
enforcement can cause increased conflict between mothers and fathers).
259. See Lisa Kelly, If Anybody Asks You Who I Am: An Outsider's Story of
the Duty to Establish Paternity, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 297 (1994); see also
Hatcher & Lieberman, supra note 7, at 7-8 (utilizing a similar narrative).
260. Kelly, supra note 259, at 302-03.
261. Id.
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"I'm sorry James, I just can't. I need the money and the card.
Ijust do."
"Well then, I guess you won't be needing me no more.,,262
Studies show that at the time of the birth of a new child, young
unmarried parents in "fragile families" have the potential for a
healthy relationship and even the possibility of marriage. 263 Most of
the mothers want the fathers to have significant involvement in
their children's lives and the fathers want to do right by their
264
children.
The fragile families have hope. But rather than
building on that hope with supportive services aimed at encouraging
265
healthy relationships, welfare cost recovery adds turmoi1.
Moreover, in addition to the conflict between mothers and
fathers, welfare cost recovery also adds conflict into the
relationships between the parents and their children. Fathers can
be further alienated from their children as they are unable to make
payments and thus may reduce visitations out of embarrassment or
simply the desire to hide from enforcement efforts. Even the
relationship of mother and child can become adversarial. Most
266
children hope for a relationship with their absent parents.
Unable
to understand the forced system in which their parents find
themselves, the children are witness to their mothers suing their
fathers in court and may blame one or both parents when their
fathers retreat further from family contact.
Thus, the potential for welfare cost recovery to increase
paternal responsibility and deter out-of-wedlock births is uncertain
at best, and the elusive quest comes at a high cost. Competing state
interests collide and family relationships can be weakened. A core
262. [d. at 303 (footnote omitted).
263. Sarah McLanahan et aI., Fragile Families, Welfare Reform, and
Marriage (Brookings Inst., D.C.), Nov. 2001, at 2, http://brookings.edulpapers/
2001l12childrenfamilies_mclanahan.aspx (explaining that "[olne of the most
striking findings from the Fragile Families Study thus far is the high rate of
cohabitation among unmarried parents," that "[alt the time of birth, half of
unmarried mothers are living with the fathers of their children," and that the
"majority of unwed parents are optimistic about their future together").
264. [d. ("Most fathers say they want to help raise their child, and the
overwhelming majority of mothers say they want the fathers to be involved.");
see also Chambers, supra note 6, at 2597 ("In addition, some of these
unemployed and marginally employable men who are not supporting their
children have informal relationships with their children that the mothers
applaud and that might be lost if they are turned into fugitives.").
265. See Murphy, supra note 8, at 356, 373.
266. See Maldonado, supra note 206, at 998 ("Although millions of children
grow up having little contact with their fathers, almost all express a desire for a
father and feel rejected when their fathers are not involved in their lives.").
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legislative 'purpose of the TANF program is to encourage the
formation and maintenance of two parent families-to bring fragile
267
Why then, is a policy continued whose
families together.
conflicting interests often tear fragile families apart?
IV. SUGGESTED REFORMS

Child support enforcement actions should not work against the
interests of children. This simple notion is echoed by courts across
the country. Yet, as long as states continue their welfare cost
recovery efforts, children's interests will conflict with the States'
fiscal pursuits-and the children's interests will lose. This Part of
the Article presents a resolution to the conflict that is long overdue.
A.

End Welfare Cost Recovery
Welfare cost recovery is a failed effort. The policy harms
children, harms society, and results in minimal, if any, net fiscal
benefit to government. Child support officials have long talked of
the need to shift priority from cost recovery to increasing support to
families, but a sufficient shift has yet to occur. The recent child
support changes in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 provide an
important step in the right direction, allowing states increased
discretion and incentives to pass through more assigned child
support back to families. However, even if the legislation proves to
be successful and many states take advantage of the new flexibility,
welfare cost recovery efforts and the resulting harm will continue.
The obvious solution to stop the harm and fix the legal morass
resulting from the conflict is to simply end welfare cost recovery.26B

Use Child Support to Support Children
The first step in ending welfare cost recovery is to eliminate the
child support assignment requirement in TANF so that all child
support payments will be distributed to support children and
families. With the assignment requirement eliminated, states will
no longer have a fiscal interest in child support that conflicts with
the best interests of the children. The legal confusion resulting from
the conflict will be resolved and the redirected support payments
will significantly assist families in their struggle for economic
stability and self-sufficiency.269
Ideally, once distributed to children and their families, all or at
least a significant amount of the child support should then be
1.

267. 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(4) (2000).
268. See Murphy, supra note 8, at 370-71.
269. See KRAUSE, supra note 14, at 15 (describing the existing legal
confusion).
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disregarded from countable income for purposes of establishing
eligibility for TANF or other public assistance programs. As the
success of the Wisconsin waiver program has shown, a disregard
policy will help lead to increased child support payments, increased
family economic stability, and lower child poverty rates. 270

2. Value Choice
Next, choice should replace coercion. By eliminating the child
support cooperation requirement from TANF, mothers applying for
welfare assistance will be able to decide whether or not to pursue
child support against the absent fathers. Caseworkers should
clearly notify welfare applicants of the services available from the
child support offices and explain the benefits of receiving child
support. However, a decision by the parent to decline child support
services should not affect eligibility or result in any reduction of
welfare benefits.
Eliminating the cooperation requirement will place the decision
of whether to pursue child support with the person best able to
assess the benefits and detriments. 271 A mother applying for welfare
will be able to consider the relationship with the absent father and
whether opening a child support case would harm the fragile
relationship that often exists. Some parents may decide that
forgoing child support services will allow the relationship to grow
more amicably, encouraging more informal support and cooperative
assistance in raising the child, and even possibly leading to
cohabitation and marriage. Parents will also be able to assess
whether the potential benefits of pursing child support are
outweighed by the risk of domestic violence from an abusive, absent
272
parent.
As the Supreme Court of Kentucky had the foresight to
recognize over 170 years ago, the pursuit of child support should be
a choice, and the mothers-rich or poor-should possess that

270. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text. A child support
disregard policy has long been advocated. Harry Krause, one of the staunchest
proponents of increasing child support enforcement efforts against low-income
fathers, recommended that child support payments made by welfare fathers
should benefit the children and should not result in lower welfare benefit
payments. See Krause, supra note 20, at 15.
271. Czapanskiy, supra note 206, at 949.
272. See Harris, supra note 18, at 656 ("It seems reasonable to suppose that
welfare mothers are just as able as nonwelfare mothers to decide whether the
monetary benefits that do exist - including the advantage of having a support
order in place when welfare ends - make it financially worthwhile to try to
establish paternity and enforce support. Welfare mothers, like nonwelfare
mothers, can also make rational decisions about whether or not the 'social
benefits' of establishing paternity outweigh the disadvantages.").
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273
choice.
Inevitably, replacing coercion with choice will result in fewer
welfare families in the child support caseload. However, such a
reduction can be an improvement through a well-informed process of
self-selection. Those families who decide the benefits outweigh the
costs will remain in the system, and those families who see no
benefit or are concerned with the potential detriments will no longer
seek the child support enforcement services. Then, as the national
child support caseload declines through a reduction in the cases that
may be the least likely to result in child support payments and
generally have the highest administrative costs, program savings
can be redirected to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
enforcement services for those families who truly need and desire
the help.274

B.

Steps in the Right Direction
Until the welfare cost recovery requirements are eliminated in
their entirety, several improvements are possible. First, states
should immediately take advantage of the new options provided in
the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 by passing through more assigned
child support back to families, disregarding the payments from the
TANF eligibility calculations, and implementing the "families first"
policy for tax refund intercepts. 275
Then, states should take advantage of the flexibility to broadly
define their good cause exceptions to the child support cooperation
requirements and simultaneously improve the methods of ensuring
that TANF applicants are aware of the process for requesting
exceptions. The exceptions should include broader circumstances
that protect the best interests of the children and support the
relationships in fragile families. States might also experiment with
exceptions that can encourage improved relationships between the
parents. For example, in households where the parents are not
cohabitating at the time of TANF application but a healthy
relationship is possible, the custodial parent could be provided with
a good cause exception to the child support cooperation requirement
while the parents seek counseling, take parenting skills courses, or
obtain job training. 276 In appropriate cases, the parents could then
work towards reunification-or at least a healthy and collaborative
relationship--without the added conflicts resulting from welfare cost
273. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
274. Harris, supra note 18, at 657.
275. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
276. Effective screening for potential domestic violence concerns would be
necessary.
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277

recovery through child support enforcement.
Also, to begin addressing concerns with unmanageable, stateowed arrearages, Congress should consider revisiting the federal
law commonly known as the Bradley amendment, which prohibits
278
any retroactive modification of child support obligations.
An
exception to the rule for government-owed arrearages would allow
courts discretion to reduce arrearages in circumstances where
continued collection efforts would result in significant hardship or
detriment to the children's interests. And such an exception would
only have the potential to eliminate past support obligations-likely
uncollectible-that are owed to the government and thus would not
result in a reduction of support owed to families. 279 Moreover, other
options to address unmanageable arrearages are possible, such as
debt leveraging programs where low-income obligors are encouraged
to pay current support owed to the families while the governmentowed arrearages are gradually forgiven in exchange. 280
277. As a complement to the broadened good cause exceptions, states might
also experiment with increasing the awareness of two-parent benefits available
under TANF and possibly broadening the definition of such two-parent
assistance units to take into account circumstances where the parents are living
apart but cohabitation is possible with appropriate supports. To implement
such a strategy, a state may need to first seek a waiver from the existing federal
.
TANF requirements.
278. See Levesque, supra note 241, at 34-35 ("[Flederal law now prohibits
retroactive modification of child support for children on AFDC. Despite its
popularity, the rule is potentially devastating. Not only does it limit judicial
discretion, it may inadvertently lead to unjust results .... "); see also KRAUSE,
supra note 14, at 26 ("The important question of whether, in an appropriate
case, modification should be allowed retrospectively (and thus wipe out or reduce
accumulated arrearages) has been answered variously. While the finality of a
judgment and accrued installments must be given due consideration, the better
view permits the elimination of 'impossible' arrearages.").
279. To implement such an exception, consideration would have to be given
to the new options of states under the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 to pass
through assigned child support payments back to families to ensure the
potential for such payments is not eliminated.
280. Such a program operated as a pilot project in Baltimore for one year,
and state legislation introduced in 2007 by Delegate Kathleen M. Dumais to
create a statewide "Child Support Payment Incentive Program" was signed into
law. H.B. 263,2007 Gen. Assemb., 423rd Sess. (Md. 2007) (The author of this
Article collaborated in the development and support of the legislation.). The
Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement supports such a strategy. OFFICE
OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT FY 2003 PRELIMINARY DATA REPORT (2004), available at
http://www .acf.hhs.gov/programs/cselpubS/2004lreports/preliminary_data/.
We know that about half of the debt is owed to the
government, and not to the families .... We need to be more
aggressive about leveraging older debt owed to the

1086

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

CONCLUSION
Two of the primary purposes of the TANF welfare program are
encouraging the "formation and maintenance" of two-parent families
and helping families to achieve economic self-sufficiency.281
However, welfare cost recovery-also a centerpiece of welfare
policy-undermines both TANF goals. The government's effort to
recoup welfare costs derives from the simple theory that the
responsibility for supporting children should rest primarily with the
parents rather than posing a burden upon society. As absent
parents are forced to reclaim the responsibility, the reasoning
continues, the social fabric will be strengthened. But as welfare cost
recovery interacts with the economic reality of welfare parents' lives,
the theory falters. Children in welfare families lose out as their
support payments are redirected to the government at the time
when their families are most in need of the additional financial
assistance. The fragile relationships between mothers, fathers, and
children are often broken. The net fiscal benefit to the government
is minimal, at best. And the social fabric is torn as significant
numbers of welfare fathers retreat from the workforce and their
families. The solution lies in the words of the obligation. Child
support should only be pursued when providing support and benefit
to the children. This Article does not seek to eliminate the child
support obligation; it simply seeks clarification so that child support
becomes pure in its purpose.

government as an incentive to obtain more reliable payments
of current support to families. If we do, I suggest that state
and Federal governments will do better as families become
more self-sufficient and less dependent on Medicaid and other
public benefits than they have been doing in collecting old
child support debt owed to those governments for long-ago
welfare payments.
[d.
281. 42 U.S.C. § 60l(a) (2000) ("The purpose of this part is to increase the
flexibility of States in operating a program designed to-(l) provide assistance
to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the
homes of relatives; (2) end the dependence of needy parents on government
benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (3) prevent and
reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual
numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies;
and (4) encourage the formation and maintenance oftwo-parent families.").

